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ORDINARY PBRCEPTION AND ITS OBJECTS
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jar's non-existence even when it exists on the ground, for the ground as such exists wbile there is a jar on it. Hence non-existence is something distinct from its locus.
Abhāva or ron-existence is of four kinds, namely, prāgabhava, pradhvaṁsābhāva, atyantābhāva, and anyonyābhāva.' Some Naiyāyıkas, however, bring the first three under the head of sansargābhāva and recognise only two kinds of non-existence. Samsargābhāva or the negation of a con. nection is that which is different from anyonyābhāra or the negation of identity. In the one the connection between two things is denied, in the other we deny the identity or sameness of two different things or concepts.
Prāgabhāva or antecedent non-existence is the non-existence of a thing prior to its production, e. g. the non-existence of an effect in the cause. So long as the effect 18 not produced, it is non-existent in the cause. This kind of non-existence is said to be without a beginning but not without an end (anādıḥ sāntah). It is subject to cessation (vināśya). The effect never existed before its production, so that its non-existence has no beginning. Its production at any time means the end or cessation of its previous nonexistence. Prāgabhāva thus refers to the past non-existence of a thing and implies the possibility of its future existence. Like the past it has no beginning but has an end, since it ends just when the thing begins to exist. The present existence of a thing ends its past non-existence, just as the past has its end in the present.
Pradhvaṁsābhāva or emergent non-existance is the nonexistence of a thing pastartox to its destruction, e.g. the? non-existence of an effect when it is destroyed. This kind of non-existence has a beginning but no end (sādiranantaḥ).
1 SD, pp. 83-84. I TS., p. 89 Cf VP., Ch. IV. INVT., 2. 2. 12 ; BP & 8 , 12
• BM , 12 ; TB , p. 29; T8., p. 89. 25—(1117B)