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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
aspects of the antaḥkarana. As such, there is a natural identification between these and the antaḥkarana or the mind. This identification means a perception of all that is identified with the antahkarana. In short, mental states are perceived facts because they are mental, and so do not require any sense to perceive them."
As to the question how cognition or knowledge is known, there is a sharp difference of opinion among pbilosophers. Some thinkers who deny the possibility of introspection would say that knowledge can never be known. This is the position taken up by Comte, Dunlap and others. Comte thought that knowing cannot be known, since it involves a division of the mind into two parts, wbich is impossible So too, Duplap, in his article “ The case against Introspection,"urges that there is a dualism of subject and object, that the subject can never become object, and therefore there can be no awareness of an awareness. He says. “Knowing there certainly is ; known, the knowing certainly is not." Again he says : “I am never aware of an awareness” But if this is so, how do we know that there is any knowledge or awareness at all ? Dunlap says that it is ' by being aware of something ?' This means that when I am aware of something, I am aware of being aware of it To know something is thus to know that something is known. Hence it cannot be denied that knowledge is somehow known, be it by introspection or not. As Russell has pointed out, 'the statement “I am aware of a colour" is assumed by Dunlap to be known to be true, but he does not explain how it comes to be known.'
Hence the next question is How is it that knowledge is known ? According to the Sāṁkhya, the Prābbākara Mimāmsā and the Advaita Vedānta, knowledge is known by
1 VP , Ch 1.
Psychologscal Review, Sept., 1912 • Analysis of Mond, p 115,
