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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
on a proposition (vākyajanya), it cannot but be relational in character. A proposition is the assertion of a relation between two things, of which one is the subject and the other predicate. Hence the knowledge this is that man' must be savikalpaka or predicative. To this the Advaita Vedāntist replies that a proposition which asserts the identity of an object does not come under the law of predi. cation. When we say this is that man' we do not predicate that man 'of' this' It is not the case that we relate this man 'with 'that man,' but simply assert the identity between the two. An identity proposition (akhandārtha vākya) thus gives us non-predicative or non-relational knowledge (nirvikalpaka jñāna). Thus we see that, according to the Advaita Vedānta, nirvikalpaka perception is a judgment of identity expressed in a proposition The identity that is perceived in nirvikalpaka does not pertain to any of the specifi, attributes or parts of the perceived object. It refers only to the unity of the object as an unrelated essence, i.e. as pure being. But while the
identical' perceived in nirvikalpaka is an abstract unity of being, our knowledge of it is a propositional judgment of the non-predicative order (akhaņdārtha vākya). The Velăntist furtber holds that nirvikalpaka perception is self-manifest or self-conscious knowledge. It is perceived by itself (pratyakşa), and does not require any other knowledge to manifest or perceive it. It follows also that we have first the savikalpaka perception of an object as related to certain qualities and then a nirvikalpaka perception of it as a unity that remains identical with itself under different conditions.
According to the Buddhists, nirvikalpaka is the only type of valid perception. It is such cognition of an object as contains no element of thought or ideation in it (kalpanā
1 VP., Ch. T.
