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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
character of being an object of our knowledge' (jñātatā). But how can a thing have this character of being known),' unless there was previously some knowledge of it ? Hence from the character of 'being known' or being cognised' in the known object we infer the antecedent existence of knowledge or cognition. Thus knowledge is neither selfmanifested nor directly perceived, but inferred from the character of 'knownness' or 'cognisedness' (jñātatā) in the object that has been known or cognised, The Naiyāyikas reject this view on the ground that 'knownness' cannot be a character of objects, for objects acquire no character from their relation to knowledge.
The Naiyāyikas, as we have already seen, hold that knowledge is known by introspection or internal perception (mānasa pratyaksa). According to them, cognition or knowledge manifests its objects, but not itself. It points beyond itself and can never be directed to itself. Hence cognition or knowledge cannot be self-manifested. It does not, however, follow that knowledge cannot be at all known or manifested. Just as an object is manifested by a cognition of it, so one cognition is manifested by another that follows it and makes it an object to itself. First there is the cognition of an object (vyavasāya), and then another cognition coming after it cognises the first, 1.e. there is an after-cognition (anuvyavasāya) of the first cognition. It follows that every cognition is not necessarily cognised, that awareness of an object is not always an awareness of itself. It is only wben the self or mind attends to, and casts an introspective glance at it, that one cognition or knowledge is known or perceived. This view of tbe Naiyāyikas has the support of many modern introspectionists like Stout, Laird and others. Thus Stout observes : "Psychical states as such become objects only when we attend to them
1 TR , P 53 , TD, p 32,
