Nyaya Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): S C Chateerjee
Publisher: University of Calcutta

Page 55

NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
6. Theories of Illusion in Indian Philosophy The explanation of errors of perception bas been a perplexing question for all philosophy. The question is this : How are we to explain the false perception of silver in a shell ? Is it due to the object itself ? Or, is it due to our subjective attitude towards the object ? According to the Nyāya, while valid knowledge (pramā) is objective in the sense of being grounded in the object itself (arthajanya). all error is subjective in so far as it is due to the introduction of a certain foreign character into the object by the knowing subject (adhyāropa). In the case of the mirage, for example, there is nothing wrong in the object. “The object all the while remains what it actually is. In regard to the flickering rays of the sun, when there arises the cognition of water, there is no error in the object : it is not that the rays are not rays, nor that the flickering is not flickering; the error lies in the cognition: as it is the cognition which instead of appearing as the cognition of the flickering rays, appears as the cognition of water, i.e. as the cognition of a thing as something which it is not.”! From this it follows that there is no error in the simple apprebension (ālocana) of the object. The object as given in indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception consists of a number of actually present fickering rays of the sun. But on account of certain defects in the sense organ and the influence of association and memory, the given datum is misinterpreted as water in the determinate (savikalpaka) perception of it. Hence the error lies not in the indeterminate perception of the given but in the determinate perception of
it as worked up and modified by some representative Celements.?
1 NV., 1. 1. 4.
NVT., 1 1.4,