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THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION
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doubt and error as forms of perception, in which there is sense-contact with some object.' | This means that a definition of perceptio , as valid knowledge (pramā) should explicitly mention that validity is an essential character of it. But the context makes it unnecessary for the Mīmāmsaka. Similarly, the Sāmkhya view is considered by the Naiyāyika to be inadequate, because it does not expressly state the fact of sense-object contact. Such criticism however is vitiated by a sophistical spirit. It is true that Iśvarakrsna does not use just the phrase 'senseobject contact' in his definition (viz pratuvisayādhyavasāyo drstam). But this follows clearly when we collate the sūtra and the commentares on this point It is therefore unnecessary to dwell at length on the Nyāya criticism of the above definitions of perception. It will suffice for our present purpose to say that the definition of perception as knowledge produced by sense-stimulation or sense-object contact is common to the Nyāya-Vaisesika, the SamkhyaYoga and the Bhātta Mīmāmsā system of Indian philosophy. As we have already said, the same definition of perception is generally accepted in Western psychology and philosophy s
The modern school of the Nyāya takes exception to the old definition of perception in terms of sense-object contact. Kangesa, the father of modern Nyāya) opposes it on several grounds. First, it is objected by him that the definition is too wide, since it applies to inference and memory as forms of knowledge in which there is sense-object contact. The mind as an internal sense is operative and related to the object known through memory or inference. Secondly, the
1 Ibid. 3 NM., P 109
3 Cf. Sir J. H. Parsons, An Introduction to the Theory of Perception, p 3: " Sensory presentations, as we experience them, invariably evolve perception, however naïve it may be, at the start but there 18 no perception without sensory presentation"
18—(1117B)
