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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION
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unintelligent. The senses cannot explain all mental functions. Imagination, memory, ideation, and the like are independent of the senses of sight, hearing, etc. The mind too cannot take the place of the self If the mind be, as the Nyāya-Vaiseșikas hold, an atomic substance, then the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc , in it must be as imperceptible as the mind itself If, on the other hand, the mind be a series of cognitions, each manifesting itself, then memory becomes inexplicable No member of a mere series of cognitions can know what has preceded it or what will succeed it (vāsanāyāh samkramāsambhavāt). “A succession of ideas is not an idea of succession. The Advaita Vedāntin's idea of the self as eternal self-shining intelligence is no more acceptable to the Naiyāyıkas than that of the Buddhists. There is no such thing as pure intelligence unrelated to some subject and object Intelligence cannot subsist without a certain locus. Hence the self is not intelligence ils such, but a substantial principle owning intelligence as its attribute. The self is not mere knowledge, but a knower, an ego or the 'I' (anamkārāśraya).' Still knowledge or intelligence is not an essential and inseparable attribute of the soul. The soul is, in itself, neither material nor mental, but a neutral substance which comes to have the attribute of intelligence or consciousness in its relation tu the body ?
According to the Nyāya, the self is the fundamental ground of all mental functions. It is involved in all cognitions, affections and volitions. All the experiences of au individual, whether cognitive or otherwise, must inhere in the selt and cannot be separated from it. What are known as innate faculties of the mind, the reflexes, instincts and inborn feelings of fear, batred, etc., are all conditioned
1 BP and SM , 48-50. 2 NV ,11 22, NM., p 432.
