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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
this sense, has been conceived in different ways by different schools of philosophy. We find four main views of the self in Indun philosophy. According to the Cārvākas, the self is either the body with the attribute of intelligence or the aggregate of the senses of sight, hearing, etc. This is the materialistic conception of the self. The Buddhists reduce the self to the mind as a stream of thought or a series of cognitions. Like the empiricists and the sensationalists, they admit only the empirical self or the me.' Among the Vedāntists, some, the Advaitavādıns, take the self as an unchanging selfshining intelligence (svaprakāśa caitanya) which is neither subject nor object, neither the ' I' nor the 'me' Other Vedāntists, the Viśıştādvaitavādıns, however, hold that the self is not pure intelligence as such, but an intelligent subject called the ego or the 'I' (jñātāhamartha evātmā).'
The Nyāya-Vaiseşikas adopt the realistic view of the self. According to them, the self is a unique substance, to which all cognitions, feelings and conations belong as its qualities or attributes. Desire, aversion and volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are all qualities of the self. These qualities cannot belong to the physical substances, since they are mental. Hence we must admit that they are the peculiar properties of some substance other than the physical substances. The self is different in different bodies, because their experiences do not overlap but are kept, distinct The self is indestructible and eternal (nitya). It is ubiquitous or infinite (vibhu), since it is not limited in its activities by time and space. The body or the external senses cannot be called self because intelligence or consciousness cannot be their attribute. The body, by itself, is uncouscious and
1 Vida Sribhåsya, 1 1.1. & NS , 1.1.10, P8, pp. 80 1. 3 BP , 61
