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same.1 Like Plato's " ideas," or essences of the mediaeval realists, sāmānya or the universal is a real entity which corresponds to a general term or class-concept in our mind. Some of the modern realists also hold that a 'universal is an eternal timeless entity which may be shared by many particulars.' The Naiyayı kas agree further with the modern realists in holding that universals do not come under existence (satta). These do not exist in time and space, but have being and subsist in substance, attribute and action There is no universal subsisting in another universal (sāmānyānadhikaranatvam), nor Is there any universal for particularity (viseṣa), inherence (samavāyu) and non-existence (abhāva).2 Modern realists, however, do not admit with the Naiyayikas that all universals pertaining to sensible objects are capable of being perceived by the senses. According to the former, we can perceive only such universals as may be called "sensible qualities," as for example, colour, whiteness, hardness, etc.
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
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1 TB, p 28, P8, p 164
2 BP. & SM., 14, 15
According to the Naiyayikas, the universals that subsist in supersensible objects are imperceptible (atindrıyavrttīni atīndriyāņi). The universals that inhere in perceptible objects (pratyakṣavrttīni) are perceived by the senses which perceive their locus. The universals of substances or things (dravya) are perceived by the senses of sight and touch provided they are visible and tangible things respectively. Thus jarness (ghaṭatva), treeness (vṛkṣatva) and manhood are universals that inhere respectively in all individual jars, trees and men. When perceiving any of these individuals, we directly cognise also the universal inhering in it Here the second form of sense-contact, viz. samyukta-samavāya, functions. The universal" jarness comes in contact with
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3 Vide, Russell, Problems of Philosophy, Chs IX, X 4 TK., p 9.
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