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190
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
say that attributes actions, universals, etc., are not independent entities, but a pects of the same substance, and that we do not require a new relation like samarāya to relate them to substance
The Vedāntin's criticism of the Nyāya view of samavāya seems to miss the essential point. From the standpoint of a common sense realism the Naiyāyıka maintains the distinction between a substance and its attributes or actions, the universal and the individual, the whole and the part. It may be conceded to the Vedāntin that we have no experience of attributes and actions without a substance, of the universal without the individual, of the whole without its parts. It may also be admitted by us that attributes, actions, universals, etc , do not exist except in a substance. But from this we cannot conclude that a substance is identical with its attributes and actions, or that it is an aggregate of the aspects of attribute, action, universal, etc. Two entities may be inseparable and yet not identical, only if tbey are different and distinct in our experience. We cannot, indeed, have any experience of attributes without a substance But the same experience tells us that a substance is distinct from its attributes, and the attributes are distinct from the substance. A substance is not an attribute, nor a group of attributes. There can be no attributes without some substance. Hence the existence of attributes presupposes the distinct reality of a substance. That we ascribe different sense qualities to the same substance also shows that the substance is not identical with any of them, but is distinct from them all. What we mean by a substance is, therefore, different from what we mean by an attribute. The substance stands for the continuant' or the reality underlying the changing characters of a thing, and the attributes stand for its properties or powers of manifesting certain characters under certain conditions. Although an attribute is not a substance, yet it is inseparably
