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and citta, according as it functions respectively in the states of decision (niscaya), conceit (garva) and recollection (smarana). It is the antahkarana which performs these and other mental functions, such as cognition, feeling, desire, etc. Hence by the mind we are to understand, not manas, but antahkarana as conceived by the Vedantist According to him, the mind is not an atomic substance, but an inert principle of limited dimension (parıcchinna). Although inert (jada) in itself, it manifests pure intelligence (cartanya) and is therefore regarded as intelligent in a secondary sense (jñānatvopacāra). The mind is not a sense (indriya) whose existence is proved by inference from the perception of pleasure, pain, etc Direct knowledge or perception is not due to sense-object contact We have a direct perception of the mind when we perceive the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., in it And a perception of these mental states does not require any internal sense, called manas, in the other systems
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It is to be observed here that the view of mind as sense is not acceptable Those who take the mind as internal sense deny that it is a physical (bhautha) thing of any kind. So the mind as sense cannot be a physiological apparatus like the brain or any part of it that is directly correlated to conscious processes. The mind as a nonphysical sense is analogous to the inner sense conceived as a special faculty of inner experience in traditional Western psychology. But the one is quite as unnecessary as the other to explain the facts of consciousness It is the internal perception of pleasure, pain, etc., that is held to require an internal sense. But if by sense we mean, as the Naiyayikas do mean, a medium of contact between mind and hen the mind itself cannot be a medium of
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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
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VP, Ch 1
Vide Klemm, History of Psychology
