Book Title: Nyaya Theory of Knowledge
Author(s): S C Chateerjee
Publisher: University of Calcutta

View full book text
Previous | Next

Page 130
________________ TEST OF TRUTH AND ERROR 111 It maintains that both truth and falsehood are internally conditioned and immediately known, i.e. are self-evident. There is no exact parallel to the above theory of truth in Western philosophy. It is true that in modern European philosophy knowledge, in the strict sense, is always taken to mean true belief. But truth or validity is not regarded as intrinsic to all knowledge, independently of all external conditions. It is in the writings of Professor L. A. Reid, a modern realist who owns no allegiance to the current schools of realism, that we find some approach to the view that truth is organit to knowledge. But even Reid makes it conditional on knowledge efficiently fulfilling its function, namely, the appichension of reality as it is He thinks that truth is nothing else but knowledge doing its job. Thus le says “Truth is, ideed, simply, .. the quality of knowledge perfectly fulfilling its functions." Again be observes “If knowledge were not transitive, if we were not in direct contact, joined with reality, then all our tests, coherence, correspondence, and the rest, would be worthless"! Here truth is admitted to be a natural function of knowledge, but not as inberent and self-evident in all knowledge. In the theory of intuitionism, we find a close approach to the view of self-evident validity To the question ‘How do we know that a belief is true or valid ?' intuitionism has a simple answer to give, namely, that we know it immediately to be such. As Hobhouse puts the matter “Intuitionism bas a royal way of cutting this, and indeed most other knots. for it has but to appeal to a perceived necessity, to a clear idea, to the inconceivability of the opposite, all of which may be known by simply attending to our own judgment, and its task is done." 2 Among intuitionists, Lossky has made an elaborate attempt to show that truth and 1 L A. Reid, Knowledge and Truth, pp 185, 199, 204. Hobhouse, Theory of Knowledge, p. 488

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440