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THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION
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The Buddhist definition of perception has been criticised and rejected by the Naiyāyıkas It has been pointed out by them that Vasubandhu's definition of perception is too wide. If by perception we are to mean a cognition wbich is objectively determined (tato'rthādujñānam), all true knowledge will have to be regarded as perception. As Bosanquet has rightly pointed out, “reality is operative in truth." 1 Thus a true inference has an objective basis in so far as the conclusion expresses a real relation between two things. So we may say that what is validly inferred is an objective fact which is causally efficient towards the inferential cognition Similar is the case with the other kinds of valid knowledge Even the wrong cognition of silver in a shell is not without some objective basis. The wrong judgment, 'that is silver,' is based on the 'that'as an objective fact Further, on the Bauddha view of universal momentariness (ksanıkavāda), we do not see how perception can have an objective basis. The object being the cause of perception must be antecedent to it. So when the perception is or appears, its momentary cause, namely, the object, must cease to exist The object cannot therefore be the cause of perception. But if perception be not directly produced by the object, we cannot call it perception at all.2
Later Bauddba logicians like Dignāga, Dharmakīrtı and others reduce perception to a mere sensation free from all conceptual determination. This, the Naiyāyikas think, is logically indefensible and arbitrary. None of our ordinary perceptions is a pure sensing of the given datum. On the other hand, perception 18 the interpretation of sensations by associated images and ideas. It is now a commonplace of philosophy that “perception contains not merely sensuous and revived images, but a large element
1 Logic, Vol II, p 289 1 NV & NVT., 1.1 4.
