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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
ascertain the truth in a more convincing way, say, by a process of inferential reasoning. But the inference which confirms the testimony may, in its turn, require further verification by way of direct perception of the object. Perceptual verification is thus the final test of all other knowledge and, as such, perception is the most important of all the methods or sources of human knowledge."
In European philosophy the validity of perception as a source of knowledge is rather overstressed by the empiricists and some modern realists. According to them, the truth of perception is unquestionable and self-evident. Thus J. S Mill remarks . " Whatever is known to us by consciousness (intuition), is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels."?? So also W. T. Marvin tbinks that “ perception is the ultimate crucial test, and as such, it does not presuppose its own possibility. It simply is ; and the man who questions it assumes it in order to do the questioning.'3 Similarly, Russell tells us repeatedly that the truths of perception are self-evident truths, for which we require no test at all. The Naiyāyikas, however, do not admit that the validity of perception as such is self-evident and unquestionable. That perception is the final test of all other knowledge does not mean that the truth of perception is self-evident or that it cannot but be true. From the standpoint of common-sense to olism they grant that, under normal conditions, wildan is directly perceived is not doubted and so need not be further proved or tested. When however any doubt arises with regard
1 Sä сeyam pramitih pratyaksapară, NB., 1. 1 3. 2 System of Logic, p. 4. 3 The New Realism, pp 66-67.
4 Problems of Philosophy, Chapter XI , Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 72,
