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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
The Advaita Vedanta defines pramana as the operative cause (karana) of prama or true knowledge. It defines pramā in two ways. First, pramā means knowledge that has both the characteristics of novelty and uncontradictedness (anadhigatābādhita). This means that true knowledge is uncontradicted and original, .e. gives us new information. Secondly, pramā is taken to mean simply uncontradicted knowledge of objects The result is that prama is made to exclude or include memory according as we accept the one or the other way of defining pramā or true knowledge.1
3. Nyaya criticism of the Bauddha vicus of pramāna
It has been generally admitted by all the schools of Indian philosophy that pramāna is what gives pramā and that prama is true knowledge. But there is much difference of opinion among them as to the nature of the truth, which each of them claims for its pramāna.
The Buddhists generally take the truth of knowledge to consist in its capacity to produce successful activity Pramā or true knowledge (samyagjñāna) is harmonious in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity to obtain it. In fact all knowledge is meant for some action. We seek knowledge because we want to act effectively in relation to other things. Hence pramāna or the method of knowledge fulfils its function when it shows an object in such a way as to enable us to act successfully in relation to it. In short, pramā is practically useful knowledge, and pramana is the source of such knowledge.2
To this the Nyaya objects that practical utility (arthasiddhi) does not constitute the truth of any knowledge.
1 VP, Ch I
2 NBT., Ch. I.
