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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
expected results (arthakriyākhyaphalajñāna). But how do we know that the volitional experience is valid ? Does it not require to be validated by other conditions? If it does, there will be no end of the process of validation and the first perception of water cannot be completely verified 1
To this question the Naiyāyikas give two answers. First, it has been said that the experience of expected objects (phala iñāna) does not ordinarily require any test of its validity, because there is no doubt about it or because there is the fulfilment of our purpose in it. As for instance, the first perception of water in a mirage requires to be tested because we have doubts about its validity, but that of a man going into water need not be further tested, since it is not infected by any doubt and it fulfils the man's expectations
Secondly, the volitional experience of expected objects may, if necessary, be verified by certain special characteristics of it. Thus the visual perception of water may be validated by the expected tactual sensations of it, and the latter may be further confirmed by the experiences of batbing, washing, drinking, etc., which are usually associated with water. It may be urged here that a man has the whole series of experiences even in a dream. Hence it is at least theoretically possible that the first volitional experiences of water as well as those of its usual associates are as invalid as dream experiences According to the Naiyāyıkas, this hypothesis is untenable There is an obvious distinction between dream consciousness and waking experience. While the latter is clear and distinct, the former is confused and indistinct. Dreams have not the order and uniformity of our waking experiences. Dream experience is contradicted by waking perceptions. There cannot be any retrospection of dream cognitions (anuvyavasāya). What is cognised in
I NM., p 172.
