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92
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
The Naiyāyikas meet the above objection with a just recognition of the difficulties raised in it. According to them, the validity of knowledge is not self-evident, but must be ascertained from certain external conditions. In the case of new objects of experience, such conditions are to be found in the success of the practical activities based on any knowledge. The validity of knowledge is to be known from its capacity to produce successful activity. Hence prior to any conative verification, the validity of knowledge remains doubtful. It is also true that a valid knowledge of objects is the basis of our successful actions in relation to them. An action cannot lead to the expected results unless it is grounded on a true knowledge of some objects as means to some end.
So far the Naiyāyikas admit the contention of the critics. But they point out that this does not lead to the conclusion drawn by them. It does not follow that there can be no successful activity without prior knowledge of the validity of knowledge. A true knowledge of objects is by no means the necessary condition of our action (pravștti) in relation to them. Any knowledge of objects, right or wrong, is the sufficient ground for producing certain modes of action on the part of the knowing subject What happens generally is that we act even in the midst of uncertainty and that while acting we may have doubts as to the success of our actions. Even if it be true that to act for ends we must adopt means, it is not always necessary that we must have a true knowledge of the means of actions. A mere belief in the means as means will suffice for many voluntary actions. Again, successful activity may be dependent on a valid knowledge of objects. But this does not mean that we must bave a knowledge of the validity
1 Cf Stebbing, Logic in Practice, p 99.“ Many of our most important actions have to be performed in accordance with heliefs of such a kind (. e beliefs more likely to be true)."
