Nyaya Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): S C Chateerjee
Publisher: University of Calcutta

Page 86

VALID KNOWLEDGE AND ITS METHOD
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known. It follows from this that memory (smộtz) cannot be pramā or true knowledge, in so far as it is not a new experience but the resuscitation of some old experience. It has no new contents but refers only to the already acquired contents of knowledge.
Here the Naiyāyikas point out that the definition of pramā, as knowledge which has the characteristics of truth and novelty (yāthārthya and anadhiyatatva), is too narrow. It excludes many cases of knowledge which are undoubtedly valid but do not refer to absolutely new objects. Eternal objects, such as space, time, soul, God, etc., cannot be said to be wholly unknown to us. We consider them to be eternal because their non-existence at any time cannot be proved. These have a necessary existence both for our thought and the things of the world. Our present knowledge of such objects comes to us as necessary knowledge. Once we have such knowledge we cannot say either that the objects had no existence before or that we had no knowledge of them prior to this. Rather we think that we had an implicit knowledge of the objects, whatever may be the degree of its clearness or distinctness. They are a priori like Kant's categories of the understanding. As Pringle Pattison says: “Mathematical truths, as soon as we realise them, are seen to be necessary, and we seem to have known them always.'' 2 Plato supposes that our knowledge of them is a recollection. Without going so far it may be said that we have an a priori knowledge of eternal entities in the same way in which Russell & shows we have an a priori knowledge of general principles. Nevertheless, they may be better known or cognised by perception, inference and testimony. But, on the Bhātţa view, no knowledge about
1 Yathārthamagrbītagrābu'ñánam pramåņamiti, SD, P 45. 7 The Idea of Immortality, pp. 46-47. 3 Problems of Philosophy, Cb. VII.