Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Philosophy and Religion

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 29

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Traverses on less trodden path...
If perception only affirms Reality i.e. Brahman, then why not to state that it affirms this plurality of phenomenal world also. If it affirms botn, then there is a dualism of Brahman and the world. Thus argument of the Vedantins that perception only affirms positive Reality, is not justified by our experience. If Brahman is only real and this world is false, then Brahman could have been known in the first case of our normal experience and not this pluralistic phenomenal world. 30
Even the Non-duality of Brahman cannot be proved on the basis of pure logic also. When Vedantins argue that Atman is un-born, un-bound and always freed and thus, in reality, there is neither bondage nor liberation, etc., this is purely fabrication of mind and to prove such kind of Atman by inference will be completely imaginary. The consequence of this is attainment of an imaginary liberation.82 Bondage and liberation are facts and both cannot be regarded as illusory. Denial of distinctions between them in definance of experience is nothing but embracing the Scepticism or Universal nihilism,58
If non-duality of Brahman is proved with the help of valid inference which involves the proban (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya), then there is clear admission of duality between the proban and probandum. 54 The fact is that both cannot be identical because, inference will be invalid unless both are admitted as two distinct facts. Again it will not be possible to construct a syllogism which demands different members. In inference, one proves the probandum by means of proban, proceding from the known to the unknown which means inevitable dualism of the known and the un-known'. It is also illogical to argue that so far as the opponent's refutation is concerned the conditions of Inference, such as the probao, the probandum and the example, are accepted as true by the opponents and hence they are valid, because it will again lead to dualism of one's own acceptance and the acceptance of the opponent. 38 If the condition of inference (the proban, the probandum and the example) are false and thus cognition of difference be considered as false, then that
30. S. S. P. p. 8.
31. Mäṇḍūkyopanisad with Gauḍapādakārikā and Sankarabhāṣya-VaitathyaprakaraṇaVerse 32, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, V.S. 1993. p. 108.
32. T. S.-V. p. 25-26.
33. (a) A: S. p. 159. (b) S, S. P. p. 7.
34. (a) A. M. 26.
(b) A. S. p. 160-161. 35. (a) A. M. 24.
(b) A. S. P. 158.