Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Philosophy and Religion

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 90

Conception of existence...
81
whole is exclusively permanent. Some of the Buddhists hold that real is unsubstantial, momentary and absolutely impermanent. The Nyaya-Vaiše. şikas think that substance in its atomic form is exclusively permanent and in gross form, like jar, a piece of cloth etc, is exclusively characte. rized by origination and destruction. According to Sankhya philosophers, the real, in the form of conscious variety (puruşa) is exclusively permadent in nature while, the same real in the form of un-conscious variety viz. Prakrii, is both permanent-cum-transitory (parināminitya). Umásvati was well aware of all these definitions and their short commings. There. fore, to avoid all these he adopted a realistic and scientific approach and defined real as combination of change and permanence. The real even taken as a whole cannot be exclusively permanent or exclusively transitory. The positive and negative aspects must both belong to everything. If only positive aspects belong to it, there would be nothing to distinguish it from another and all the things would become one 'sar'. If instead, only the negative aspects belong to a thing, it would have do instrinsic 'ature. 38 This Jain's definition of the real avoiôs both the extreme views of absolute eternality (Vedantist view) as well as the absolute transitoriness (Buddhist view) maintaining that real is neither absolutely real por absolutely transitory, but real as well as unreal, permanent-cum-change. As against the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Jains definition points out that it is not possible to thịok that, one of the part of it is exclusively non-eternal, transitory. As against the Sankhyas, it maintains that it is not acceptable that, certain part of it is exclusively permanent while certain other part is permanentcum-change. In fact all the things deserving to be designated as 'real' must bave, a triple form. There is nothing self-contradictory about a real entity being found characterized by permanence wben viewed from standpoint of specific nature i,e. substance and the same being found characterized by origination and destruction when viewed from the stand-point of transformation. Secondly, this definition of reality gives a clue to the Jajn's view on causation. Jains disagree with the absolute views of Sankhya and Vedanta on the one hand and Nyaya-Vaišeşika and Buddhists on the other. The Satkar yavādins89 maintain that the effect is already existent in its cause before its production in an upmanifested form. If effect were non-existent in the cause anything could have been
28. Syadvadamañjari-Mallişeņa-XIV, P. 91, Ed. A. B. Dhruva, Bombay, Sanskrit and
Prakrit series, 1933. P. 91. 29. Asadakaraņāt upādājagrahaņāt sarvasambhavabhāvāt.
Saktasya Sakyakaraņāt kāraṇabhāvācca sat karyam.-Sänkhyakarika-2... Pub. Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, 1963,
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