Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Philosophy and Religion

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 88

Conception of existence...
three different kinds of people, those in favour of the pot, those in favour of the crown, and those in favour of the gold stuff, 18
The definition of substance, specially, the second character i.e. "the substance is possessed of qualities and modes" seems to be very much similar to Nyāya-Vaiseșika definition of substance. The substance, according to Nyaya-Vaiseșika, is the substratum of qualities and actions. It is defined as “the substratum where actions and qualities in here and which is tbe co-existent material cause of the composite things produced from it. 19 Without substance we cannot have qualities and actions for they cannot hang loose in the air but must be contained somewhere. Nor can substance be defined apart from qualities and actions. For Nyaya-Vaiseşika, ultimate substances are eternal, independent and individual and are infinite. All compound substances (avayavidravya) which are made of parts and arise out of the simple ultimate substances are necessarily transcient and impermanent and subject to production and destruction. But simple ultimate substances which are material causes of the compound substances are eternal and not subject to production and destruction. The definition of Nyaya-Vaiseșikas, makes it clear that it is substratum of qualities and actions and is, an inherent cause, which gives causal support to the changing attributes-qualities and actions. 20 Nyaya-Vaiseşikas seem to emphasize the substance as the substratum of qualities and actions while Jains maintain substance as a core of change and as a substratum of attributes. In the Western Philosophical History, Aristotle seems to uphold both these notions of substance. He states that “the most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward apy which possessed this mark."91 The idea of substance as the essence or the immutable core is also suggested by Aristotle. "A natural corollary to this notion is that a substance is independently existent, 28" Thus, according to Aristotle, the term existence can be applied to substance only in proper sense and qualities and relations have only a secondary existence. “Therefore, that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified
18. Aptamimams1-JII-57, Ed. : G. Jain, pub. Sanātana Jaina Granthamalā-1914. 19. Kriyagunavat samaväyikāranamiti dravyalaksanam-Vaišeşikasutra. I-1-15.
Ed., Mahadeva Gangadhar Bakre. Pub. Gujarati Printing press, Bombay. 20. The Central Philosophy of Jainism -B, K. Matilal, L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad, 1981, p. 36. 21. Categories --Aristotle (4a, 10-14), The Basis work of Aristotle, Ed. R. Mckeon,
New York, 1941. 22. The Central philosophy of Jainism-B, K. Matilal, P. 37.