Nirgrantha-2

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 63

46
N. M. Kansara
Nirgrantha
Divine Teacher'. Conception is due to apprehension and recollection and consists in a synthetic knowledge of a thing under observation with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essences underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics : for example, 'that cow is of that species; a Gavaya is like a cow.' Induction (tarka or üha) is the knowledge of the forms 'this being, this is ...', etc., arising from a critical examination of the facts observed and non-observed and consisting in the establishment of relationship, which subsists in all the three times, such as that between the proven and the mark; for example, whatever smoke there is, all that is only when there is fire; if it be not there smoke would not be there.
Inference is of two kinds : for one's own self (svārtha) and for others (parārtha). Of these, the inference-for-one's own-self consists in a knowledge of the proven (sādhya), through the apprehension of the mark (hetu) and the recollection of its inseparable relation to the Dharma. The one and the only characteristic of the mark (hetu) is that its incapability of being known otherwise than in connection with the Dharma is known for certain. The proven (sadhya) is what is undetermined, unopposed, and desired. It is a well-known abode (dharmi) having that phenomenon; it is otherwise called Paksa. The Dharmi is known to us either through mere supposition or through the pramanas, or through both. An inference consisting in a statement of the abode and the mark is called the inference-for-the-sake-of-others (parārtha), by transference of epithet. To show that the proven is in the particular occasion connected with the abode, the explicit statement of the abode is certainly necessary, just like the statement showing the inherence of the mark. The mark may be indicated in two ways : 'It is got along with it', and 'otherwise it is not got at all. The first of these two implies that the mark exists only when the proven exists; and the second implies that the mark does not exist if the proven does not exist; for instance, 'that kitchen has fire in it because only if there be fire, smoke can be perceived there, or if there be no fire, smoke cannot be perceived there.' To establish the proven, the use of one of them being sufficient, the use of the other is unnecessary where one has been used. And since, because of its internal inseparable connection (antar-vyāpti) the mark is capable or incapable of establishing the proven, the development of the external inseparable connection (bahir vyāpti) is valueless. To convince the dull-minded persons, however, the premises of the example, the application and the conclusion, etc., are to be used. Example is the place where the inseparable connection can be known. It is of two sorts : owing to its homogeneity and heterogeneity. In the case, where the nature of the mark being present, the nature of the proven is found to exist as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the homogeneous example; for instance, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in the kitchen.' In the case, however, where the proven being absent, the mark is shown to be absent as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the heterogenous example; for instance, where there is no fire, there can be no smoke, e.g. in the pond'. Application is showing the mark to be
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