Nirgrantha-2

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 67

Nirgrantha
the act, on the other hand, is what is to be effected (sädhya), because it is dependent on the doer for its effectuation.
50
N. M. Kansara
A pramana-fallacy is what is other than a pramana and its nature. The fallacies, regarding the nature of the pramāņa are: the view that is essentially unconscious; that it does not reveal the Self; that it reveals the Self only; the theory of the undetermined perception; and the fallacy consisting in ignorance (samdropa). It would be fallacious to regard as valid knowledge such phenomena as, for instance, contact etc., knowledge unconscious of the Self, knowledge not revealing any non-Self, pure sensation, illusion, doubt, and inattention. Pramana-fallacies are, for instance, cognition of two moons, etc., and of its being broken; this is the fallacy of sensuous perception. Fallacious recollection consists in knowing a thing in which it is not there; for instance, knowing Yajñadatta to be Devadatta. To identify one thing with another which is only similar to it; and conversely to regard one and the same thing as two similar things; cases like these are examples of fallacy regarding assimilation; like the case of twin children. Induction-fallacy consists in the cognition of a thing where no relation exists; e.g. 'whoever is his son is dark-complexioned'. Pervasion (vydpti) is invariable concomitance; e.g. He is dark-complexioned, as he is the son of Maitra'. Cognition arising from a false. knowledge about the abode, etc., is inference-fallacy. That which is undesirable, etc., is fallacy regarding the abode.
The unproved (asiddha), the opposed (viruddha), and the doubtful or uncertain (anaikantika) are (the three classes of) the mark-fallacy. The mark whose inseparable connection with the proven is not determined through the instruments of valid knowledge (pramana) is the unproved (asiddha). It is of two modes, namely unprovedto-both-parties and unproved-to-one-party. The former is unproved to both the disputant and the opponent; e.g. 'sound is subject to modification, because it is visible.' The latter is unproved to either the disputant or to the opponent; e.g. 'trees are unconscious, because they have not the death characterised by a suppression of the power of cognition of sense-faculty and of vitality. Opposed (viruddha) reason is one. the invariable connection of which is the opposite of the proven; e.g. 'the soul is eternal or non-eternal, because it is possessed of the faculty of conception, etc. The doubtful (anaikāntika) reason is one whose existence is unopposed even in the dissimilar abode; e.g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.' It is of two kinds, namely that of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is known, and that of which it is suspected. The reason of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is the fallacious reason of the doubtful class; e.g. 'sound is eternal, because it is knowable. That of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is doubted is the fallacious reason of the doubtful class; e.g. 'the person in question is not omniscient, because he is a speaker'. The fallacious example is one in which both what effects and what is effected are unproved and in obverse relation; e.g. Sound is not-man-made, being endowed with form; like sensual pleasure, an atom and a pot. Reverse agreement also, e.g. 'whatever is not man-made is unmanifest, being liable to