Nirgrantha-2

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 69

52
N. M. Kansara
Nirgrantha
omniscient nor an authority; because he upholds the doctrine of absolute unmomentariness; one who is omniscient or an authority upholds the doctrine of unmomentariness; as for instance, Sugata.' (5) Sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka; e.g. "The person referred to is one whose words are not to be accepted; because he has passions, etc.; as for instance, the son of Suddhodana.' (6) Sandigdha-ubhaya-vyatireka; e.g. Kapila is not free from passions; because he has not, out of pity, given to beings, who deserve mercy, a piece of flesh from his body; one who is free from passions, gives out of pity a piece of flesh from his body to beings who deserve mercy; as for instance, Tapana-bandhu.' (7) avyatireka; e.g. "The person referred to is not one who is free from passions; because he is a speaker; one who is free from passions is not a speaker; as for instance, a piece of stone.' (8) apradarśita-vyatireka; e.g. 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is a product; as for instance, ether.' (9) viparita-vyatireka; e.g. 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is a product; whatever is not a product is eternal; as for instance, ether. Fallacies with regard to application and conclusion consist in stating them in contravention of the principles, implied in their definitions. The examples are as follows : (1) upanayābhāsa; e.g. 'Sound is subject to modification; because it is a product; whatever is a product is subject to modification; as for instance, a pitcher.' (2) nigamanābhāsa; e.g. in that very instance, (to say) 'So sound is a product, or to say 'So a pitcher is subject to modification.' (3) Āgamābhāsa consists in cognition arising from the words of a false authority. For instance : 'On the bank of the Mekalakanyakā, at the foot of the tāla and hintāla, dates are found in abundance; make haste; go on, go on, O Ye calves! (4) Samkhyābhāsa; e.g. 'Direct perception is the only form of valid knowledge.' (5) Visayābhāsa consists in regarding the class-essence alone or the particular alone, or both of them isolated from each other as the object of valid knowledge. (6) Phalabhāsa consists in thinking that the fruit is the same as valid knowledge, or that fruit is different from it. Out of the 87 sūtras of the sixth pariccheda of the PNT, śubhavijaya Gani has adopted 57 sūtras for his sixth pariccheda of the SVB; out of these, about 15 apparently seem to be slightly modified, but in fact they are adopted from Māņikyanandin's Pariksāmukha-sútra in toto, along with seven more. The seventh Pariccheda of the SVB opens with the definition of Naya. It consists in taking cognition of a part of the object known through the Pramāna. The Naya-Fallacy (nayābhāsa) consists in denying the aspects other than the one with which one is concerned for the time being. It is of two kinds: the Expounded (vyāsa) and the compounded (samāsa). In its expounded form it is of many sorts. In its compounded form it is of two kinds, namely the Dravyārthika, i.e. the naya which considers the substantial aspect, and the Paryāyārthika, e.g. the one which considers a thing in its modifications. The first is of three kinds, namely the Naigama, i.e. non-distinguished, the Saṁgraha, i.e. generic, and the Vyavahāra, i.e. practical.
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