Nirgrantha-2

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 70

Vol. XX, 1996
The Naigama signifies both of either two characteristics or of two substances or of a characteristic and a substance, holding up one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'In soul, there is an ever-existing consciousness' we have an instance of holding up two characteristics, one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'A thing is substratum, modified' we have an instance of holding up two substances, one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'A self engrossed in the worldly affairs gets happiness for a moment only' we have an instance of holding up a substance as the chief and the characteristic as its adjunct. Now, their fallacies: (i) Naigamabhāṣā consists in a tendency to absolutely separate the two attributes, etc; e.g. to consider that 'in the soul existence and consciousness are absolutely separate from each other'; similarly other instances.
Syadvada-bhāṣā...
The Samgraha-naya takes account only of the common or the general aspect. It is of two kinds ultimate and non-ultimate (i) The ultimate (parasaṁgraha) consists in assuming an attitude of indifference to the infinite particulars of a thing and fixing solely upon its barest substratum which is equal to pure existence; e.g. The universe is one, for there is no difference in the being of all things'. Its fallacy consists in maintaining the absolute identity of all beings and denying all the particularities; e.g. 'pure existence is the only reality, for particularities apart from that are not apprehended. (ii) The non-ultimate (aparasamgraha) consists in taking into consideration such non-ultimate generalities as substantialities, etc., and assuming an attitude of indifference to their various modes; e.g. Principles of motion, rest, space, time, matter, soul - all these substances are one, because all of them have substantiality which is identical'; and so on. The fallacy with regard to this consists in recognising the generalities such as substantiality etc., alone and denying the reality of their modes; e.g. Substantiality is the only reality, because substances other than it are not perceived; and so on.
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The Vyavahara-naya is that view-point by which matters which are objects of the Samgraha-naya are systematically divided; e.g. Whatever is existent is either a substance (dravya) or a mode (paryaya).' The fallacy with regard to it consists in a tendency to divide the substances and the modes into unreal sub-classes; e.g. the Cärváka philosophy.
The Paryayarthika is of four kinds the straight-expressed (Rjusütra), the Verbal (Sabda), the subtle (samabhirüḍha), and the Such-like (evambhüta). (i) The Rju-sūtranaya consists in a tendency to fix on, or emphasise, only the mode which is straight, i.e., existent for the present; e.g. 'Now, there is pleasure.' Its fallacy consists in denying the substance in toto; e.g. the philosophy of the Tathāgata. (ii) The Sabda-naya attributes different meanings to a word in accordance with the difference in tense, etc.; e.g. The Sumeru mountain was, is, and will exist in future', and so on. Its fallacy consists in maintaining a real difference in objects in accordance with the difference in tenses, etc.; e.g. In the expression, 'Sumeru was, is, will be', the words