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KARMAWOGING Y
in the legislation and administration of the country. We shall show under the third head that we have gained nothing in this direction. On the other hand not only class,as was formerly the case, ut creed has been. rade the basis of representation And, therefore, unless the Hindus have the strength of mind to boy ett a system which creates a distinction insulting as well as injurious to the community, this measure, while giving us not an atom of self-government, will be a potent engine for dividing the nation into two hostile interests and barring the way towards the unity of India. Formerly, there we only two classes in India, the superior European and the inferior Indian; now there will be three, the supreme European, the superior Mahomedan and the inferior Hindu. This is loss number one, and it is no small one, to the Mahomedan no less then the Hindu. The official of course gains.
the remaining six all are representatives of the landholding class who dare not be too independent, although they will no doubt oppose in small matters, which they can do with impunity as there is not the slightest chance of the Govern ment being defeated. The consequence will be that on the Viceroy's Council there is not any reasonable chance of there being a single independent member representing the people. This startling result of the Reforms may not seen at first credible, but if our argument is carefully followed, it will establish itself. No doubt, one or two men like Mr. Gokhale, Sir Pherozshah Mehta or Dr. Rash Behari Ghose will be admitted by permission, but that privilege we had on better terms under the old system.
Even if there is no democratic or even semi-democratic basis of elecTon-merely small established bodies which can in no sense be called the people, something might I gained if the Councils were so composed as to give a preponderance or powerful voice to independent elected representatives. That
Let us pass to the Bengal Councils and establish our position. In East Bengal there will be twentytwo nominated and two specially nominated against eighteen elected members establishing at once a standing Government majority of six. Of the eighteen who might oppose, there will be four members
who are
in the nature of things bound to be Europeans and four specially elected Mahomedan members, which what the Councils profess to do once raises the reliable Government and that is why so much parade is vote to thirtytwo; five representatives made of the non-official majority. of District and Local Boards, who, What are the facts? In the Viceroy's Council there are to be thirty-five avowedly Government members, twenty-eight being officials and seven nominated. Of the twentyfive elected members eleven will be ment from the new Councils all over India; as we shall show from the Bengal examples thes, Councils will contain a predominant proGovernment vote even among the non-official members and their representatives will be therefore proGovernment men. That makes forty-six reliable votes for the Government. Of the remaining thirteen two will be Europeans who will naturally side with the Governinent; that makes forty-nine. Of the remaining eleven five will bo specially elected Mahomed in representatives and, as under the Dew system the Mahomedans are a favoured class depending for the Continuance of that favour on good In-haviour. that means another live reliat votes for the Govern Tent, which makes fifty-four. Ot
from the preponderance of Mahomedans on those bodies, are bound to be Mahomedans, two representatives of landholders of whom one at least is likely to bo a Mahomedan and the other, being a landholder, cannot afford to be too independent. There remain three members of Municipal bodies who are all likely to be independent, if the elections are not interfered with by indirect. pressure. Therefore, out of forty two members only three are likely to be independent members. It is noedless to point out that the representative of the non-official members on the Viceroy's Council is sure to be a pro-Government man.
We pass on to West Bengal where things ought to be better. Here there are twentytwo nominated against twentysix clected members, giving at first sight a non Governinent majority of fur. But wo have to subtract from the apparent majority and add to the apparent minority four members from
at
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European or predominatingly European constitutuencie Bur Mahomedan members and the member for the University, now practically a department of the Government. That gives a Government vote of thirtyone and a possible opposition voto of seventeen. Of these again five are represen tatives of the landholders who cannot be independent to any notable extent and of whom only: one or two are likely to be independent at all. There are therefore, only twelve votes of which we can any hope, the representatives of the Boards and Municipalities. Here also the independent section of the community is hopelessly ineffective in numbers. Only four of these will be representatives of Bengai and this is one of the inost joyous results of the policy of partition and deportation plus co-operation which is the basis of the new measure. Here again the chances of an independent representative being returned to the Viceroy's Council ure small on paper, nil in reality.
When we come to the freedom of the electors in choosing their representatives, we find restrictions so astonishing as at once to expose tho spirit and purpose of these reforms. The Boards and Municipali ties which alone represent in a faint degree the people are debarred from electing anyone not a member of these bodies. Thus at one blow it is rendered impossible for a popular lender like Sj Motilal Ghose, unless the Government choose to nominate him, to be on these amazing Councils. Farther, anyone dismissed from Government service, e. g. Sj Surendranath, sentenced at any time to imprisonment or transportation, e. g. Mr. Tilak, or bound down, e. g. mofussil leaders like Sj Anath Bandhu Guha or Sj Hardayal Nag, the leading men of Mymensing and Chandpur respectively, or declared by the authorities to be of undesirable antecedents, g. Lala Lajpat rai, Sj Aswini Kumar Datta, Sj Krishna Kumar Mitra and all Nationalists and agitators generally, are ipsofacto incapable of representing the people under the exquisite reforms.
After all this it may m waste of tin to go into the question of the scop, buctions d powers of the Councils. They briefly be summed up by myg that the councils have
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