Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 29

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIX.
different.--and not according to the sameness or diversity of the sense-organg concerned ".
The actual words of Kumärila are as follows:-"That which is cognised by more sense-organs than one does not (on that account) become diverse : for, if it were so, then any and every object would have to be regarded as diverse on the ground of its being cognised by the sense-organs located in the bodies of different persons.--If it be urged that 'in this case the sense-organs of all persons would be of the same category or class, and as such, in a way, identical ', -then we could have the same in the other case also, the class
sense organ' being one and the same. The class Being also is not regarded as diverse, even though it is perceived by diverse sense organs, because it is always recognised as the same ". (Shlokavārtika-Sense perception, 156-157.)
This however is not right. Even when the difference is based upon the difference of cognitions, what has been urged remains equally applicable to what is meant to be proved (by the Opponent). For instance, in regard to the case in question also, the following might be said :-That the difference among things is due to the difference in cognitions is not true (conclusive): for instance, when several persons perceive Colour, there is diversity of cogni. tions,-and yet the Colour is not diverse; if one-ness (sameness of the Senseorgans) is assumed on the basis of the eyes of all persons belonging to the same class Eye ', then the same sameness may be attributed to Colour, Taste and other things also, because even though these Cognitions are diverse, yet they all belong to the one class Cognition'; and this would be a direct contradiction of the assertion that Colour, etc. cannot be regarded as one, -because their cognitions are different' (found in Shlokavārtika-Senseporception, 158).
Thus the answer provided (by Kumärila) is of the nature of a 'Futile Rejoinder
If it be urged that--"Just as, even when there is difference in the Specific Individualities, there are certain characteristics upon the differ. ence or non-difference of which people regard things as different or nondifferent, and treat them as the basis of conceiving of things as one or diverse; this is what we mean by the difference and non-difference of cognitions", - all this would be equally applicable to the case of Sense-organs also. So enough of this.
Nor can the connection, etc. etc.';-that is, the relation between Words and Things expressed by them cannot be that of being produced by them; as this would be not true; because even when the Thing is not there, the Word may be there, through the mere wish of the speaker.
Nor is there any other kind of inseparability between the two, except that of Cause and Effect; if any such were postulated, it would lead to absurdity.
From all this we conclude that the Word cannot serve as a valid means of cognition of the thing spoken of by it.-(1513-1514)
Says the Opponent-" If that is so, then how is it that it has been declared (by a Buddhist writer) that- Verbal Cognition is not a distinct form of Cognition, because it proceeds from Inference ; just as the Inference,