Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 28

OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
753
follow that all his assertions are true ; because it is always possible that some assertion may be untrue. If it were not so, then the definition would be false.-(1511-1512)
Having thus proved that both definitions of Verbal Cognition are defective, the Author points out objections to Verbal Cognition in general :
TEXTS (1513-1514).
WHAT IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WORDS AND EXTERNAL OBJECTS,
BY EXPRESSING WHICH LATTER THE WORDS WOULD BE 'TRUE' (VALID) ?-THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM CANNOT BE OF THE NATURE OF being the same in essence,—BECAUSE THEY ARE APPREHENDED BY DIFFERENT SENSEORGANS, AND FOR OTHER REASONS. NOR CAN THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM BE THAT OF one being produced from the other; BECAUSE THIS IS NOT TRUE. NOR IS THERE ANY OTHER CONNECTION POSSIBLE WHICH COULD BE TRUE.
(1513-1514)
COMMENTARY
As a matter of fact, between Words and External Things, there is no such relation as that of sameness or of being produced, -by virtue of which relation, the words expressing such things would be regarded as true. For instance, the relation of sameness is not possible between them,- because of such reasons as their being apprehended by different sense-organs ; i.e. words are apprehended by a sense-organ which is different from that by which the things are apprehended; for instance, word is apprehended by the Auditory organ, while things are apprehended by the Visual and other organs.-By other reasons are included differences of Time, Place, Appearance, Causes.
Kumarila has argued as follows: "The argument that, one thing is different from another because they are apprehended by different senseorgans', is not Conclusive ; because in a case where the same colour is seen by several persons, the Colour will have to be regarded as different, because it is apprehended by different sense-organs. It might be argued that all the sense-organs apprehending the Colour belong to the same universal Eye ', so that the Colour is really perceived by a single sense-organ'. But, in that case, though 'Being' is perceived by several sense-organs, yet the Universal
Sense-organ' being one, it would be perceived by the same sense-organ, and hence have to be regarded as one. For these reasons things have to be regarded as same or different, according as their cognitions are same or