Gandharwad

Author(s): Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Jain Granth Prakashak Sabha

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the time being. Truly speaking, the essence of all jtvas is consciousness and it is only superficial to advance the theory of plurality of jîvas. It is only a relative conception and cannot be taken as an ultimate truth. Still, however, this distinction of spirits is justified in the sense that it distinguishes good from the bad, Brāhmanas, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and S'üdras, from each other, insects, birds, snakes and so on. For, the Jaina canon dictates that if there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be distinguished from one another, nor could they experience different lots; there would not be Brāhmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas and Sūdras; insects, birds and snakes. All would be men and gods. We make equal both those who lead a blameable life and those who, in this world, practise right conduct. 2 0
Thus unlike other systems of philosophy, Jainism asserts the doctrine of pluralistic realism.3 1 (c) The theory of Knowledge
Like the theory of Soul, that of knowledge is also distinctive of Jainism. The Jainas admit five kinds of knowledge viz., Mati, S'ruti, Avadhi, Manahparāya, and Kevala.
1. Mati is ordinary cognition obtained by normal means of sense-perceptions. We always have sense-perceptions or dars'ana prior to the rise of mati-jñāna.
2. S'ruti or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words. While mati-jñāna gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives us knowledge by description.
20. Vide Sūtrakritānga. ii, 7-48 and 51.
21. Of Bosanquet-“It is freely admitted that in cognition, the self is universal. It goes out into a world which is beyond its own given being and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding, it ceases to be a self-contained and repellant unit."
(Gifford Lectures, Second Series, Chap. II)