Syadvada Manjari

Author(s): Mallishenacharya, F W Thomas
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

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F. W. Thomas, Mallişeņa's Syâdvådamañjari Surely, now, those have not outgone defects. How otherwise could they, even if they look for the destruction of heresies, descend into existence ?
Says one: 'If so, let us have only "failings outgone"; "with infinite knowledge is superfluous: because upon transcending of defects the possession of infinite knowledge is inevitably realized'. - Not so, because some do not admit that, even when there are no defects. So, in fact, the text of the Vaiścșikas):
“Let him see everything or let him not: but let him see the approved Truth. What use to us his complete knowledge of the number of insects ?“5) Further: "Therefore let his rightly placed cognition be considered.
II authority belongs to the far-seeing, let us here worship vultures“). For the purpose of excluding these views, the expression "infinite knowledge" is quite faultless: because without infinity of knowledge (5) there is no correct complete knowledge cf even a single thing. And so the Scripture (Arşa)"):
“Whoso knows a single thing, knows everything. Whoso knows everything, knows the single thing". And also:
"By whomsoever has been seen in all ways a single existence, By him have been seen in all ways ail existences; By whomsoever all existences have in all ways been seen,
By him one particular existence has in all ways been seen"8). Surely, then, 'of tenets irrefutable' is meaningless: because, as one equipped with the said quality is infallible in his statements, the tenets stated by him are insusceptible of refutation'. - No! because you do not realize what is intended. Only if worked out by a faultless person is a tenet irrefutable. Not other tenets, those which are without personal author, etc.: because they are infected by the fault of impossibility, etc.: it is in order to hint at this. Or the epithet 'all else' is in order to preclude a shaveling Kevalin) whose absolute knowledge takes the form of making an end, dumbly saving only himself, and who is incapable of working out such tenets.
9 The Vajseșika philosophy, which probably owed its name to its recognition of 'particularity' (visesa) as a category, was one of the oldest of the 'six systems'. Having been expounded in Colebrooke's Essays and Max Müller's Six Systems of Indian Philosophy and in several histories of Indian Philosophy, as well as in editions of texts and other special works, it may here be taken as known. But among fairly recent treatments reference may be made to Professor Faddegon's The V. system described with the help of the oldest texts and Professor A. B. Keith's Indian Logic and Atomism. In Mallisena's time the system may have been best known as expounded in the commentary of Praśasta pada and its sub-commentaries. It is elaborately discussed in Sammati-tarka, pp. 657-700, and Prameya-kamala-martanda c. IV. The particular doctrines discussed infra (vv. IV-IX), pp. 19-57, will be authenticated by references there.
Source of quotation untraced : with 'far' in place of everything' it is v. 441 in Haribhadra's Yogabindu. ) v. 439 in Yoga-bindu.
Acäränga, 1. iii. iv. 122 (M. L.). In Jain Sanskrit the term ärşa, originally referring to Vedic rsis, was used as designation of the (Prakrit) language and content of the Jain Canon: see also p. 166.
*) Quoted also in Siddhasena's Sammati-tarka (p. 63 of the edition by Sukh Lal and Bechar Das, who note the variant tattvatah for the first and last sarvatha of the text): also in Manibhadra's commentary on Haribhadra's Sad-darsana-samuccaya, v. 46.
) The munda-kevalin, like the Buddhist pratyeka-buddha, saves only himseli. On kevalin, possessor of complete knowledge, see Outlines of Jainism, p. xxxvi, Pravacana-sara, tr. Faddegon, pp. 19-20.