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Verbal Testitmony
presence of certain accessories. This, however, does not mean that these accessories taken by themselves would yield the result in question. For example, an eye possesses the capacity to see things but it actually sees things only in the presence of an accessory like light; this however does not mean that a blind person would see things only if they are placed in a well-lit compartment. Similarly, a word comes to acquire a meaning for a novice only when he has cognised the relation obtaining between this word and this meaning, but that does not mean that this word could thus yield this meaning even in case it did not possess it originally.
Section X1 (Sphotavāda) In this section Kumārila seeks to explain what he understands by a word (rather by the generic entity in Sanskrit called sabda of which two subspecies are letter - Skt. varna - and word-Skt. pada). He comes out with the definition that a sabda is what is an object of auditory perception irrespective of whether it yields a meaning or not (v. 5). An individual letter is the case of a sabda yielding no meaning (v. 7). a word (-composed-of-letters) is the case of a sabda yielding meaning (v. 6). The exact import of this distinction becomes evident as Kumārila's argument develops. Thus he first undertakes a long description of what a letter is (vv. 9-64). He arguse that since a letter is never found to possess constituent parts one and the same letter must be being pronounced whenever and wherever it is pronunced just as sky since it possesses no constituent parts is one and the same entity whenever and wherever it is observed (vv. 9-15). The opponent asks Kumārila to account for the diffence that obtains between two cases of pronouncing one and the same letter; Kumärila retorts by asking the opponent to account for the identity that obtains between these very two cases (v. 15). The opponent submits that two cases of pronouncing the same letter are identical insofar as the same universal resides in them while they are different in so far as they are two seats of the same universal (v. 16). The sum and substance of the Kumārila's counter-argument is that two entities can be said to be two 'seats of the same universal only in case they are found to exhibit mutual similarity as well as mutual dissimilarity but that since two cases of pronouncing the same letter exbibit po inutual dissimilarity whatsoever (this in turn because a letter exbibits no constituent parts) they cannot be said to be two seats of the same universal (vv. 17-22). Soon afterwords, however, Kumārila, goes on to concede that whatever differences might be exhibited by two cases of pronoucing the same letter must be due to the two nādas (air-vibrations) that are active in making manifest this letter in these two cases; nay, he even points out that he is speaking of one and the same letter being made manifest by two nādas precisely as the opponent speaks of one and the same universal being made manifest by two particulars falling under this universal (vv. 23-26). Little wonder that at the close of his argument Kumārila frankly admits that
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