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Verbal Testimony
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maintain that it consists in disconnecting cowness from non-whiteness and whiteness from non-cowness. Against these theories, it is first argued that all talk of a 'connection' or 'disconnection between X and Y makes sense only when it is possible for the cognition of X to exist simultaneously with the cognition of Y but that since that is not possible the theories are untenable (vv.19-29). Then it is argued that no 'connection' is possible between cowness and whiteness because the two are two independent entities existing in their own right (vv. 29-31). It is conceded that a particular body can well be 'connected with both cowness and whiteness, but it is at once pointed out that since a particular body is never what a word means this cognition of 'connection will not be a case of verbal cogniti n (vv. 31-32); nay, it is even added that cowness and whiteness do not actually coexist in one and the same body (vv. 34-35). Against the theory of disconnection' it is urged that a mere employment of the word 'white' should not disconnect' cowness from blackness etc., for cows which are black etc. are a matter of common cognition (vv. 37-38); and granting that the word 'white' signifies disconnection from blackness etc. the question is asked why this disconnection should be linked with cowness--certainly, got simply because the word 'cow exists in proximity to the word 'white' (vv. 38-39). This leads to a lengthy argumentation purported to maintain that a mete proximity of certain words should not suffice to establish a relation between their respective meanings (vv. 39-44); (it can easily be seen that the question is as to what distinguishes the proximity of words in a sentence from their meaningless proximity). Coming back to the theories of 'connection and disconnection' it is argued that they do not constitute sentential meaning because they can be proved to be nothing over and above the word-meanings concerned (vv. 44-46). More generally, it is argued that nothing new existing objectively is produced by these word-meanings--so that to see the sentential meaning as something new produced by the word-meanings concerned is a case of subjective illusion (vv. 46-67). (in this connection a theory is refuted according to which the relation between two word-meanings exists eternally and is only made manifest when the words concerned are uttered in proximity (v. 47-49). Then keeping in mind several theories of sentential meaning catalogued in a famous verse of the grammarians the following submissions are made summarily (vv. 49-55) :
(1) Certain words grouped together do not constitute a sentence because they do not render any service to one another (vv. 49.52).
(2) There exists no single impartite sentenc: (vāk ya-sphoța) just as there exists no single impartite word (padasphoța) (v. 52).
(3) There exists no sentence--universal just as there exists no word--universal (v. 52).
(4) The successive order obtaining among certain words does not constitute a sentence just as the successive order obtaining among certain letters does not constitute a word; (in the case of a sentence a further difficulty is that the words of the
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