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Slokavårtika—a study
feature and a specific feature (such a cognition the same thing as what Kumārila calls deter ninaie perception--takes place on the basis of the physiological act in question). Kumārila has some inkling of all this when he compares indeterminate perception with the cognition of an infant or that of a dumb person (v. 112) - his idea being that indeterminate perception is devoid of all employment of words, a description true of the physiological act in question; but as a matter of fact, even determinate perception can proceed on without an employment of words and the more important thing to realize is that the physiological act in question is not at all an act of cognition. Further light falls on this question when we consider Kumārila's account of determinate perception.
(iii) Why Posit Determinate Perception
(vv. 120-55, 229-54)
The Buddhists maintain that perception is that cognitive act which immediately follows sease-object contact so that memory etc. which are soon after employed with a view to determining the nature of the object concerned in this respect or that are not themselves a part of perception but certain post-perceptual thoughtprocesses. By way of supporting this position he offers two arguments, one based on etymological consideration the other based on factual considerations; they run as follows :
(i) The very etymologs of the word praț yakşa (the Sanskrit word for perception and being of the form prati + akşa where akșa means sense-organ) suggests that perception ought to be a sense-born process but memory etc. in question are not a sense-born process and so ought to fall outside the limits of perception proper.
(ii) The object concerned in all its particularity is already cognized by the time memory etc. in question start operating with a view to seeing this object as a thing possessed of these features and those---so that to the extent that these features actually belong to this object their observation is a case of memory and to the extent that they do not belong to it their observation is a case of false superim. position.
Kumārila's consideration of these two Buddhist arguments is a mixed up lot but it should be possible to disentangle his refutation of the first from that of the other. Thus the following is what he urges against the first argument: "Even indeterminate perception is not born of a sense-organ alone - so that to say that perception is that cognitive process which is sense-born is merely a matter of definition or a matter of popular convention; nay, so far as popular convention is concerned it rather supports the identification of all perception with determinate perception. (vv. 130-33). Then according to the Buddhist himself there are cognitive processes (e.g. self-cognition on the part of an act of kalpana) which are perceptual and yet take place without the instrumentality of an ordinary sense
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