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Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
81
So here the phenomenon X is cognized in the case (i) through perception, in the case (ii) through inference, in the case (iii) through analogy, in the case (iv) through implication and barring the case (iv) the phenomenon Y is always a capacity (while in the case (iv) too the phenomenon X is a capacity). Kumärila himself elsewhere cor cludes his treatment of implication by talking as if its sole function is to posit a capacity in a thing acting as a cause; but he also there says that its another function is to act as it does in what is his case (v) (v.47). In his case (v) the phenomenon X is cognized through the means of valid cognition called absence and its treatment is inordinately long (covering 39 verses-viz. v v. 8-46-of the total 88). Kumarila is here silent about his case (vi) which he treats almost as a class by itself and which he describes after the concluding remark in question has been made; in this case the phenomenon X is cognized through verbal testimony and its treament too is inordinately long (covering 38 verses-viz. vv.51-88-of the total 88). So, according to Kumārila a case of implication arises either
(i) when a capacity is posited in a thing acting as a cause, or
(ii) as in his case (v), or
(iii) as in his case (vi) We consider the three alternatives one by one.
Kumärila thinks it necesary to argue why the case of positing a capacity in a thing acting as a cause is not a case of inference. Thus in his view inference necessarily requires the establishment of vyapti between the probans and the probandum and this in its turn reya ires that both the probans and the probandum be of the form of something on to observation; but since the capacity posited by him is ex hypothesi something supersensuous it cannot act as a probandum in any inference-not even in one where the effect concerned acts as a probans (vv.48-49). We have earlier found Kumārila describing a valid probans as one whose presence necessitates the presence of the probandum concerned and this description should apply to the case where an effect is a probans and the capacity residing in the cause concerned the probandum. But now he seems to be making a new point that a supersensaous thing can never act as a probandum in any inference-so that the logical necessity compelling one to posit the existence of a suprasensuous thing must be a case not of inference but of implication. A somewhat similar trend of thought emerges in connection with Kumarila's case (v) to which we turn next.
On Kumārila's showing, the observation that a living person (named Caitra) is absent inside his house logically necessitates the assumption that he is present at a place outside his house (v. 8). In this connection he undertakes a very long and laborious argument to show that here the knowledge that Caitra is present at a place outside his house cannot be acquired through any inference whatsoever. Kumkrila's point is that all inference requires a locus, a probandum and a probans but that in
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