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ślokavārtika—a study
cannot be a valid probras because it is already the locus (v.31), but that objection is invlid). As a mitier of fact, for Kumārila nothing can act as a probans here because whatever it be it must have vyāpti with the probandum which in this case is an absence while on the opponent's view an absence can be cognized only through inference so that the cognition of this probandum even at the ti.ne of grasping the vyāpti concerned will require another prior vyāpti and this phenomenon of requring a prior vyāpti should go on ad infinitum (vv.39-37). However, Kumārila does not leave the matter at that, for as we noted above the real probans for inferring 'absence of A' is absence of "preception of A"'; so he next endeavours to show that 'absence of preception etc,' too will not be a valid probans in the inference under consideration (v. 38). Of course, even now Kumārila's most weighty objection is that no vyāpti can obtain between 'absence of perception etc.' and 'absence of A' because now not only the probandum but even the probans is the form of an 'absence' (vv.40-42). But towards the end Kumārila now raises certain other objections as well. Thus he says that in the inference under consideration whether the locus be X or 'absence of A' it caanot have for its feature the alleged probans (v. 50). Kumārila's point is that 'absence of perception etc' is something existing in the cognizer wbile X and 'absence of A' are both something existing there in space and so the former cannot be a feature of either of the latter two; but as a matter of fact, 'absence of perception' is a valid probans for absence of the thing sought to be perceived. Lastiy, Kumārila argues that 'absence of perception etc.' cannot have vyāpti with the probandum 'absence of A''because no relation of the form of contact, samavāya etc. obtains between the two (.53); the point is valid but not much important. More significantly, Kumärila concedes that 'absence of perception etc', can have with 'absence of A' the relation called cognizer-and-the-cogaized but he adds that this relation can be noticed only after 'absence of perception etc' have already cognized 'absence of A' so that it will then be futile to use 'absence of perception etc as probans for 'absence of A'(v 52) All this brings to light a dilemmi of Kumārila. For on the one hand he must talk as if 'absence of perception etc.' is a positive cognitive process otherwise he might be asked as to why one sitting idle does not cognize an absence) but on the other hand he must talk as if absence of perception etc. is a bire absence (otherwise he loses the right to argue that an absence, in order to be cognized, requires a means of valid cognition of the form of an 'absence' just as a positive thing, in order to be cognized, requires a means of valid cognition of the form of a positive entity (vv.17,45–49, 54–55). And the solution of his dilemma lies in recognizing that 'absence of perception etc' acts as a probans for inferring an 'absence'.
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