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89
Refutation of Idealism
(i) In this inference the phrase 'cognition of pillar etc.' (describing the locus) means 'waking cognition', there being no dispute about dream-cognition being false (in fact, this being the reason why dream-cognition here acts as a corroborative instance of the homologue type) (vv. 24-25).
(ii) Here the word 'false' (describing probandum) means 'that which lacks an object'. To be more precise, it means 'that which lacks an object external to itself", for the idealist Buddhist himself concedes that a cognition necessarily cognizes itself, that is, is its own object (v. 25).
(iii) Sabara has refuted this inferance by saying that waking cognition cannot be false because it is of the form of a well-ascertained cognition, there being no reasonable ground for doubting the truth of a well-ascertained cognition (vv. 28-34).
After this preliminary reporting Kumārila launches his own polemic against the inference in question. He examines one by one the thesis as a whole, the locus, the probandum, the probans, the corroborative instance that make their appearance
here.
Against the idealist's thesis as a whole Kumārila's objection is that its cognition requires the prior cognition of a character (viz. 'being false") and that of a thing characterised (viz. 'waking cognition'); but if all cognition is without an object then the latter two cognitions should be impossible with the result that the cognition of the thesis itself should be impossible (v. 35). And granting that the cognition of the thesis as a whole is somehow possible the very rise of this cognition, Kumārila adds, will stand opposed to what the thesis Itself says; for this thesis says that all cognition is without an object while the cognition in question has this thesis for its object (v. 36). Kumārila also rejects the plea that since the feature 'lack-of-an-object (=falsity)" is not anything real it is improper to enquire as to how it stands related to the locus. in question, his ground being that nothing whatsoever can be said about an unreal thing while the idealist is saying so much about the feature in question (vv. 38-40).
Kumarila next examines what acts as locus in the idealist inference-viz. "(waking) cognition (Skt. pratyaya)". He considers four alternative meanings of the word 'cognition' -viz. the object of cognition, the instrument of cognition, the agent which cognizes, the act of cognition, (a Sanskrit word for cognition-e. g. the word pratyaya-can easily have all these meanings ). Kumarila is ready to accept the first meaning inasmuch as he too will say that an object of cognition is without an object, but he feels that the acceptance of the remaining meanings will involve the idealist in self-contradiction inasmuch as none of these things meant can occur without an object (vv. 41
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