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100
Slokavārtika--a study
The idealist next solicits support from the alleged phenomenon of a cognition necessarily cognizing itself. Here the intended argument was not that the phenomenon proves the unreality of an external object but that a cognition cannot be devoid of a 'form' (v. 21). So in a way this discussion was a continuation of that which went just before and which too was somehow concerned with the phenomenon of a cognition having a 'form'. In any case, it is now first emphasised that cognition is of the nature of an illuminator like a lamp-so that just as a lamp does not illuminate a thing without at the same time illuminating itself a cognition does not illuminate an external object without at the same time illuminating itself (v. 22). Then it is pointed out that it is possible for an external object to come into being and yet remain uncogaized but that it is impossible for a cognition to come into existence and yet remain un. cognized, for obstacles are possible in the way of an external object being cognized but not in the way of a cognition being cognized (vv. 23-26). The possibility that a cognition might be cognized through a subsequent cognition is ruled out on the ground that it will lead to an infinite regress inasmuch as the latter cognition will require to be cognized through a third cognition and so on ad infinitum (v. 27). But granting all this, it does not seen to follow that a cognition must possess a 'form' and not at all that there exist no external objects. The understanding was that if X becomes an object of cognition then X must possess a 'form' so that if a cognition becomes an object of cognition on the part of itself it must possess a 'form'. The same un. derstanding is pressed by pointing out that we often refer to an absent object-e.. a past object-as a cognized object, the understanding being that in the case of an absent object such a reference is possible only if the cognition conceraed itself was earlier cognized as possessing the form of the object concerned (vv. 28-29); similarly it is pointed out that even about a present object one often says this object must be blue because my cognition of it is of the form of blue'. the understanding being that such a statement is possible only if the cognis tion in question is blue-formed (v. 30). In the end these findings are summerized hv saying: "So an external object is not apprehended unless the cognition concerned is first grasped, nor is apprehension possible on the part of a cognition that is devoid of
form" (v. 30). However, granting even all this it is not yet proved that there exist no external objects; so it is just this that the idealist seeks to prove next.
The argument begias with a repetition of the old point that in the cognitionsituation there appears just one 'form which can bo ong only to the cognition on cerned and not to an alleged external object (v. 32). In this connection there a considered and dismissed various alternative positions which posit an external obiect and yet seek to show how a cognition can come to have a 'form'; this as follows: (1) It cannot be said that a cognition is 'formless' to begin with and that it comes to have a form' after cognizing an exteanal object. For to say that will require that this external object is cognized first and the cognition of it next; but as a matter of fact.
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