________________
104
Slakavartika—a study
cognition were one and the same thing (vv. 73-78). To cite Kumärila's examples, when a blue or yellow object is cognized as existing over there in space there takes place the cognition of an object-of-cognition but not that of the corresponding subject-ofcognition (vv. 68-81), while when a past occasion is recalled by one as an occasion on which one cognized nothing there takes place the cognition of a subject-of-cognition but not that of any object-of-cognition (82-83). The idealist pleads that an object-ofcognition and the corresponding subject-of-cognition are not cognized simultaneously because the former is cognized by the latter while the latter is cognized by another subject-of-cognition which might or might not be available immediately, his point being that a subject-of-cognition is cognized only when it becomes an object-ofcognition for another subject-of-cognition (vv. 86-88). The point is sought to be supported by the analogy of cases where something is actually present but is not cognized because of the non-availibility of the necessary means of cognition; e. g. both colour and hot touch are present in light but the former alone is cognized, the property transience or non-transience belonging to a word and as such being something non-different from it might remains uncognized even when this word itself is sonized (vy. 89-92). Kumärila remains unconvinced, for he simply argues that when X and y are absolutely identical with one another it should be impossible for one of them to be cognized without the other too being cognized. (vv. 94-96). And by examining the alleged analogical cases it is shown that in each the two things of which one is cognized and the other not are not absolutely identical with each other but somehow different from each other (vv. 97-106). Kumārila's point is that a cognition is one simple, single entity which should be either cognized or not cognized and that if both the object-of-cognition and the subject-of-cognition are one with this cognizer then both should be either cognized or not cognized; at the most one can say that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition, in order to be cognized, regnire each other's presence, but such a presence is necessarily available so that nothing should prevent a simultaneous cognition of both (v. 107). The idealist submits that in a cognition both the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are agent but that neither is recognized as such, Kumärila retorts that X and Y appear
different even when X is not recognized as X nor Y as Y, his point being that contrary to our actual experience a cogaition must exhibit two district forms when two distnict things are present in it (vv. 107-109).
2 vv. 110-18 : Kumārila then reverts to his criticism of the idealist position that
bition necessarily cognizes itself. The idealist bases himself on the consideration that the memory of a past cognition is a very common occurrence while theoretically
Suld be possible in the case of all past cognition; and his point is that the emory of a past cognition should not be possible unless a cognition is necessarily
ized at the time it takes place, which cognizing should be undertaken by this
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
