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Slokavartika-a study
statomont-part 'I knew this thing then' is false of the present cognition, the statement-part 'I am koowing it now' is false of the past cognition, while the two together are false of each (vv. 115-19). Nor can it be said that the two cognitions in question are somehow one because they are similar, for this explanation will not work in the case of the statement 'I knew a cow then and I am knowing a horse now'. (vv. 121-22). It will not do to say that even in this new case the two cogoi. tions in question are similar qua kaower, for then one should find it possible to employ the word 'I' not only in respect of oneself but in respect of all knower whatsoever (vv. 122-23). Nor can it be said that two cogoitions, in order to be referred to as 'I', must belong to the same series, for even there they continue to be two different cognitions so that the later one should refer to the earlier one as 'it' not as 'T' just as it refers to as 'it' not as I a cognition belonging to another series or a jar (vv. 123-24). A statement like 'I am heavy,' 'I am lean' is false, becauso wo also say 'thy body is heavy' 'my body is lean' (v. 127); on the other hand, in the statement "here is my soul the word 'I' can be said to stand for soul and thd word 'soul' to a temporary cognitive state of this soul (vv. 130-31)". Kumärila concludes the section by arguing that it should be a misconceived venture to read denials of soul into a Vedic statement, for there are so many Vedic statements - most prominently the sacrificial injunctions – which posit soul implicitly and so many - most prom aently the Upanişadic discourses on the subject--which do so orplicitly (vv. 140.7).
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