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Doctrine of Soul
115
stays there in the form of a capacity, for all capacity needs a seat to reside in (v. 67). To say that body, sense-organ etc. are the needed seat will mean embracing materialism (v. 68). To conclude, if in a foetus cognition stays in the form of a cap. acity then either this capacity itself or whatever acts as its seat will be just another name for soul (vv. 71-72)". From this critique of the Buddhist position Kumarila draws the corollary that a soul must be eternal, ubiquitous, naturally possessed of the capacity to cognize; (such a soul should be in a position to get connected with one body after another even without moving about from place to place) (v. 73). Then it is argued in details that a soul can be a seat of an act (vv. 74-91). In this connection Kumārila finds it necessary to disassociate himself from the Vaiseșika position according to which action, since it is exclusi vely of the form of a vibration, cannot characterize an ubiquitous entity like soul (v. 74). His essential point is that whatever acts of the form of vibration) take place in the body, sense-organs etc. which a soul has earned as a result of its past acts must be supposed to be due to the impelling activity of this soul which is therefore to be treated as the real agent in the case of all these acts (vv. 76-79); to cite an analogy, it is like a priest performing a sacrificial act but the actorship being ascribed to the client who has, made monetary payment to the priest for the latter's expert services (v. 79). Kumāri!a also uses another analogy to show that the impelling activity of an agent can assume a variety of forms : it is through moving to and fro that the soldier employs his sword in the act of slaughter, it is through his mere words that the commander-in-chief orders about his subordinates, it is through his mere presence that the king orders about his men (vv. 85-16). Then Kumārila seeks to show how certain arguments offered by the Vaiseșika philosopher in support of the existence of soul are open to an opponent' attack (vv. 92-107). The discussion is not much fruitful, first because the arguments in question are not particularly important and secondly because in all the cases Kumarila himself maintains virtually the same position as the Vaiseșika philosopher, Lastly, Kumärila develops in considerable details the position that the notion of 'l', which is a matter of our everyday exprience, has got soul for its object (vv. 107– 36). He concedes that in the statement 'I go' the word 'l' refers to body inasmuch as going is not possible on the parts of a soul (v. 108); but his points is that in the statement 'I know it could refer to nothing but the knower and the question is as to who this knower can be (v. 110). Kumārila feels that this knower can be either a cognition itself or a soul acting as the seat of cogoition (v. 110), and that if he successfully argues against the first alternative the second must hold the field. The materialist alternative that this knower can be cognition seated in body, serse-organs etc. is dismissed off-hand though after some amount of elementary argumentation (vv. 111-14).) With this aim in view this alternative is subjected to criticism as follows (vv. 115-36): “On the supposition that the momentary cognition is knower it makes no sense to say 'I know this thing then and I am knowing it now'; for the
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