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CHAPTER V
DOCTRINE OF SOUL
Another important piece of ontological speculation is offered by Kumärila in his section on soul (Soction XVI, Atmavāda). He begins by observing that if soul (in the form of an eternal conscious entity) does not exist then all Vedic injunctions stand condemned inasmuch as they often promise a fruit-of-action to be reaped in a Dext birth (vv. 3-4). In this connection Kumārila always has in mind two prima facie viows, viz. the materialist view according to which body itself is the vehicle of consciousness and the Buddhist view according to which consciousness is of the form of a series of momentary cognitions; this becomes evident at the very outset (vy. 43). However, the view examined first of all is a somewhat odd one. For it arenes that since at the time of realising the fruit of an act one does not recall that here is the fruit of that particular act it is no use positing an eternal soul and no use following Vodic injunctions and prohibitions (vv. 8–12). Kumärila replies that the possibltity or otherwise of the recollection of a past act at the time of the tillatie of its fruit is an irrelevant consideration, for the impossiblity in question will not prove that soul does not exist or that the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions so nuolas (v. 13). By way of illustration he says that one prepares a comfortable bed to sleep on even if at the time of sleep one does not recall that the feeling of case now being experienced is a result of that prior preparation of bed (v. 18). Ney, seine further he remarks that if at the time of reaping the fruit of an act ono automatically recalled that act one would not consult scriptures with a view to learning
to what act brings about what fruit (v. 19). Then Kumärila considers the objection that if soul be an eternal i, e. absolutely changeless entity it should not be povelblo for it to be both the door of an act and the enjoyer of its fruit (vv. 20-21). Ho replies that the same soul can be both a doer and an enjoyer just as the same
on can be a child now and a youth afterwards (v. 23) or just as the same inaka can be found in a huddled state now and in a straightened state afterwards (v. 28) Komirila's point is that a single thing can well act as the common substratum of changing states (v. 29); as he puts it, 'when a later state mergos the earlier ons do not vanish for good but just gets dissolved in the common substratum in a ford waitable for the later state (v. 30). The objection just considered was favourite
Buddhists who themselves considered consciousness to be of the form of o momentary cognitions. So turning tables against them Kumarila seek to
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