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Refutation of Idealism
111
Lastly, Kumārila makes some miscellaneous remarks by way of passing verdict on certain problem arisen in the course of textual interpretation; they too are of some interest and stand as follows :
(1) vy. 230-33 : “When the opponent says that a cognition as soon as it is born cognizes an object and is cognized he is not seeking to prove that an external object does not exist, for this will not prove that. He is rather asking us as to what prevents a cognition from being cognized as soon as it is born. And he is told that a cognition is not cognized then because means for such a cognizing are not available then. To say this was necessary because there are logicians who concede that a cognition is cognized at the same time when it is cognizing an object; but even such a concession logically involves the banishment of an object."
(2) vv. 234-41 : "When the opponent says that an object is cognized only after the cognition concerned is already born he is not seeking to prove this much, for we already concede that. What he is doing is to force on us the logical implication that the cognition concerned since it is already born before the object is cognized must also be cognized before the object is cognized. However, not only in case a cognition is cognized before an object is cognized but also in case it is cognized along with the latter the exstence of an object is in jeopardy (there appearing just one form in the cognition-situation and this form preferably belonging to a cognition). That is why all efforts are made by us to prove that an object is cognized before the cognition concerned is cognized.”
(3) vv. 242-44 : "When it is admitted that there exists one case where cognition is cognized before an object is cognized the idea is not to prove that a cognition is not cognized before an object is cognized, for that will be irrelevant, rather suicidaltalk. (The case in question is when one recalls a past occasion as an occasion on which one cognized nothing.) The point is that the opponent insists that a cognition is cognized before an object is cognized because he thereby sce ks to prove that a cognition is possessed of a 'form', and he is being told that even in the one exceptional case where a cognition is cogoized before all object is cognized the cognition remains formless. Certainly, in the case in question there in no question of the cognition concerned having a form."
(4) V. 245 a : "When it s suggested that if in the cognition-situation just one form makes its appearance then let this be the form of an object but not that of a cogoition the idea is not to deny the reality of a cognition, for the object itself will remain uncognized unless a cognition takes place. So what is emphasized is that the cognition of an object comes first while the cognition of the cogoition concorned is dependent on this cognition of an object."
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