________________
Refuration of Idealism
109
(1) that a cognition is necessarily cognized at the time it is born (for otherwise no memory of it should be possible at a subsequent date),
(2) that a cognition is necessarily cognized by itself (for if it is cognized by another cognition then since the memory of this other cogntion too will be possible it too should be cognized by a third cognition and all this will lead to an infinite regress) (vv. 187–88).
Against this Kumärila objects that it is not our conmon experience that one recalls a long series of past cognitions (v. 189). But the idealist will retort that such a contingency does not arise precisely because his own hypothesis has taken care of it, for according to this hypothesis only that cognition is possibly recalled which actually took place in the past. So Kumārila's real objection against the idealist is that not all cognition which took place in the past is possibly recalled but only that one which was cognized in the past; as he puts it, to recall something that was. not cognized is like recalling a barren woman's son (v. 191). As for the objection that if a cognition is cognized by another cognition then the series of cognitions should never come to an end, Kumārila says that the series in question can bc easily terminated whenever one feels like (vv. 190-91, 193-95). As for the objection that if a cognition was not cogaized at the time it was born then it should never be recalled. Kumärila says that it cannot be recalled but it can be cognized for the first time by recalling the object cognized by it and pointing out the implication of the cognizedness of this object (v. 192). These observations of Kumārila should considerably clarify his stand on the question of self-cognizability or otherwise of a cognition. In many cases we find that both Kumārila and the idealist are appealing to the same body of facts with a view to drawing conclusions that are diametrically opposite But that should not surpaise anyone, for after all a debate is held only to decide as to which of the two hypotheses better accounts for the facts recognized as such by both the parties concerned. Re that as it may, Kumärila again concludes his discussion by rejecting the idealist's recommendation that the reality of external objects be repudiated on the ground that if a' cognition has for its object not an external object but an aspect of itself then it will be having an object that is so much proximate to itself and something related to itself. for Kumarila finds it impossible to conceive how the object of a cognition can be an aspect of this cognition itself (v. 200).
Thus ends what we have called the first and the chief-part of Kumarla's refutation of the idealist case. Its second part is discussion of the question as to how it is possible for the sams object to be cognized differently by different persons. a part to which we turn next.
Kumārila begins by considering the cases of illusory perception where the object of cognition is something not actually present, a fact from which the idealist draws
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
