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Šlokavårtika—a staidoki
the conclusion that even a case of genueine perception should come about without the object of cognition being actually present (vv. 200–11). In this connection Kumārila emphasizes two points viz.
(1) that even in a case of illusory perception the object of cognition is not such as is never present anywhere (what happens is that here an object existing at one place or time is mistaken to be located at another place and time) (v. 201 and (2) that it is well possible for a non-perceptual type of cognition to arise even in the absence of the object concerned, this being possible when an appropriate 'impression is operative (and even when it is not thus operative, as the text adds enigmatically) (v. 202).
Kumärila emphasizes that even the idealist has to account for the difference hat obtains between one cogaition and another, and he also notices that the hypothesis of an 'impression' is the latter's explanatory hypothesis (vv. 203-6). But his point is that the hypothesis of an 'impression' accompanied by an express repudia. tion of the hypothesis of an “external object' has played havoc with the idealist's ontology (vv. 210-11).
Kumārila next considers the cases where one and the same object is viewed diffrently by different observers and all the views expressed are apparently valid, a fact from which the idealist draws the conclusion that in no case is a common object viewed by two observer (vv. 212-25). Kumārila's verdict is that in such cases the object itself is possessed of numerous facets, of which this one is noticed by this observer and that one by that according as this observer is possessed of this stock of past 'impressions and that one possessed or that (vv. 215-16). As he treachapuly puts it, if a thing is observed to possess a multiplicity of forms then it is proper to attribute to it this multiplicity of forms rather than deny to it all form altogether (v. 218). His point is that just as all the sensory features colour etc. are always present in a physical object but only those of them are actully cognized in relation to which a sense-organ is appropriately operative, similarly all the so many descriptive features are always present in it but only these of them are actually cognized which happen to occur to a competent observer (vv. 223-24). As for the idealist's contention that in commoa parlance people say "the object over there is as our cognition reveals it to be, Kumārila retorts that people do not truly mean to say that the object over there is nothing but that their cognition being a means of revealing objects the object over there must be as their cognition reveals it to be (vv. 226-27). All this too throws interesting light on the relative attitude of Kumärila and the idealist so far as basic ontological issues are concerned.
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