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Štokavartika-a study.
to another cognition-series does not" (vv. 163-71). After this much argumentation Kumärila in the end recapitulates the essenial points of his entire earlier criticism of the idealist thesis that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are one and the same thing. On his showing, the subject-of-cognition is different from the object-of-cognition because the cognition of one is possible without the cognition of the other, just as the cognition of taste is possible without the cognition of colour (vv. 172-74). Employing another analogy it is made out that even if born of a cognition. a cognition cannot act as both subject and object, just as even if born of a cognition an 'impression does not (v. 175). Kumārila is ready to grant that one thing might possess a number of 'capacities' but he cannot see how one thing can possess both the capacity to act as something mental and the capacity to act as something physical (v. 177-87). This is why he rejects the idealist's recommendation that with a view to avoiding the 'heaviness' of hypothesis the reality of external objects should be repudiated and that of cognitions alone admitted (v.179).
Kumarila ends the main part of his discussion by once more taking up the question whether a cognition necessarlly cognizes itself. The idealist has argued that since cognition as a means of cognizing external objects it must itself be cognized before these objects are cognized; Kumarila retorts that the sense-organs too are a means of cognizing external objects but they are not cognized before these objects are cognized (vv. 179-80). Again, the idealist has argued that since no obstacles stand in the way of a cognition being cognized as soon as it is born it should be cognized as soon as it is born; Kumārila retorts that a cognition is in no position to cognize itself while there exists no other cognizer to cognize it when it is born; that is why a cognition is not cognized as soon as it is born (vv. 180-81). Positively, Kumārila maintains that a cognition is subsequently cognized for the first time when it is realized that the existence of the object concerned as a cognized something remains unaccounted for unless it be presumed that the cognition of this cbject had earlier taken place, this being called cognizing a cognition by way of employging the means of valid cognition called 'implication' (v. 182). Kumārila considers the objection as to why a cognition should not cognize itself when it is of the nature of an illuminator; by way of reply he recommends two alternatives, viz. (1) that a cognition does not cognize itself because it is busy cognizing its own object and (2) that a cognition does not cognize itself because it is its very nature that it should cognize its object but not itself just as it is the very nature of an eye that it should cognize colour but not taste (vv. 184-87). Lastly, Kamarila considers in details the idealist's contention that if a cognition is not cognized by itself at the time it is born then there should bo no subsequent memory of this cognition, a contention briefly considered earlier in another connection. Thus from the alleged fact that the memory of all past cognition is a possibility the idealist has drawn two conclusions, viz.
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