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Refutation of Idealism
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cognition; now he broadens the scope of his enquiry and is ready to consider the alternative that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are two different cognitions. Important ideas come to light as a result of this. Kumärila begins by arguing that since the subject and the object must exist simultancously and since no two cognitions can exist simultaneously one cognition cannot act as the subject and another as the object (v. 149). And he also rejects the alternative that the relation of subiect-and-object obtains between two simultaneously existing cognitions such that one belongs to one cognition series and the other to another, for there must obtain the relation of cause and effect between an object and the cognition produced by it (that is, between the object.of.cognition and the subject of cognition ) while no such relation can obtain between any two simultaneously existing entities (vv. 150-51). This consideration also applies to two aspects of the same cognition so conceived that one acts as the subject the other as the object, for the relation of cause-and-effect can not obtain betwcen these two entities (v. 158). Kunārila then rejects the suggestion that an outgoing cognition by producing an 'impression in the incoming one becomes an obiect of the latter, for in that case this alleged object will be a past something (vv. 158-59). His point is that it is only in the case of an illusory cognition like dream that the objest is a past something appearing as a present something while in the case of a genuine perception the object must be a present something (vv. 160-61). To clinch the matter still more convincingly, Ku närila argues that a past something cannot act as an object of perception just as an event of past life or a future event cannot-to which it is added that even if it does so there is no evidence that it is of the nature of cognition and not of the nature of an external object (vv. 162-63). Even granting that the outgoing cognition acts as an object for the incoming one Kumärila raises following objections against the idealist position. "The outgoing cogoition must be of the nature of an object alone, a subject alone or both. If it is of the nature of an object alone then it will be but another name for an extern! object; moreover, in that case not being of the nature of a cognizing something it should not produce an 'impression' in the incoming cognition just as a future cognition does not, a cognition born in another cognition series does not, a thing not definitivly knowo does not, a thing perishing as soon it is born does not. If it is of the nature of a subject alone it cannot act as an object for the incoming cognition; moreover, in relation to what should it act as a subject ? And we have already refuted the alternative that a cognition is of the nature of both an object and a subject; moreover, in that case it should stand is no need of the incoming cognition in the form of a subject, nor should the incoming cognition stand in need of the outgoing one in the form of an object. Again, a cognition and its object are supposed to be similar to each other but the outgoing cogoition and the incoming one are not simi. lar to each other inasmuch as the former acts as an object not subject the latter as a subject not object. Lastly, on the momentarist hypothesis the outgoing cognition cannot produce an 'impression in the incoming one just as the cogoition belonging
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