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Refutation of Idealism
103
which considers coctain miscellaneus questions arising in connection with textual ia. terpretation, Th: first part itself is divided into several distinct steps but it will be advisable to eximine it as on: whole because here Kumārila considers two aspects of the same question again and again, now from this angle now from that. To be precise, Kumārila here attacks two positions maintained by the idealist, viz. (i) that one and the same entity acts as sbject-of-cognition and object-of-cognition and that this entity is cognition, and (ii) that a cognition necessarilly cognizes itself. As they stand, these positions are considerably distant from each other but in Kumārila's mind they have become closely interrelated. For he fears that if he concedes that a cognition can make itself an object of itself (i. e. the second position) he might be forced to concede that an object of cognition is of the form of cognition (i. e. the first position). This results in his alternatively criticizing the two positions in question in the first part of his refutation. Nothing particulars needs to be said about the other two parts, and with this much information in the background we can proceed to consider the three parts one by one.
In the following examination of the first part of Kumārila's refutation of the idealist case the different steps of his argument are taken up in different serially numbered paragraphs.
(1) vv. 64-72 : Kumārila begins by criticizing the idealist's contention that a cogaition necessarily cognizes itself and this primarily through taking exception to the analogy cited by the latter in this connection. Thus the idealist has argued that a cognition necessarily cognizes itself just as a physical illuminater necessarily illuminates itself. Kumārila retorts that an illuminator like fire is certainly an illuminator in relation to jar etc. which are a thing illuminated but that it is not a thing illuminated because here is nothing which acts as an illuminator in relation to it (v. 65). On his showing if fire itself is to be cognized it must be cognized through something other than itself ---that is, through an eye; similarly, an eye is cognized through something other than itself, -that is, through the inference establishing the existance of the visual sence-organ; lastly, this inference, being an act of cognition, is cognized as acts of cognition generally are--that is, through an application of the means of valid cognition called "implication' (vv. 66-67). This is a clearest possible enunciation of Kumärila's understanding of the phenomenon of cognition of a cognition'.
(2) vv. 63-109 : Kumārila next criticizes the idealistos contention that a subject -of-cognition and the corresponding object-of-cognitoni are one and the same thing, both being of the form of cognition He does so by pointing out that there are cases when an object-of-cognition is cognized without there being a simultaneous cognition of the corresponding subject-of-cognition, as also cases where the opposite happens, neither being possible if an object-of-cognition and the corresponding subject-of
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