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Slokavastika-a study
102
more difficulties can be urged against the hypothesis that the contact of a cognition and an object creates a 'form' in each. For one thing, on this hypothesis no "form" should be created in a cognition that is of the form of memory, dream etc., for in the case of such a cognition no external object at all comes in picture; and when it is once granted that the type of cognition in question comes into being on account of an 'impression' alone then it too should be granted that waking cognition similarly comes into being on account of an 'impression' alone. Thus we come across cases where a cognition possesses a 'form' even in the absence of an external object and never cases where an external object possesses a 'form' even in the absence of a cogn. ition from which the conclusion ought to be drawn that the 'form' appearing in the cognition-situation belongs to a cognition and to it alone. As a matter of fact, even if it is held that a 'formless' cognition receives a 'form' from outside the outside agency imparting this form ought to be an 'impression' not an external object (vv. 51-54). (8) It too is untenable that a cognition and an external object have got the same 'form'; for the two exist at two different places, they never come into contact, they are never observed separately (v. 55). (9) Similarly untenable is the position that a cognition and an external object are not distinguished from ene another on account of a mutual similarity, for only such objects can be said to be similar as can be observed separately (v. 56).
This critical examination of the alternative positions is followed by certain con. cluding remarks intended to emphasize that neither in the case of an illusory perception like that of two moons (v. 75) nor in the case where the same thing is cognized differently by different observers (vv. 58-60) is it possible for the cognition concerned to assume the 'form' of an externally existing object, the point being that in all these cases the observers concerned are viewing an object created through the instrumentality of an impression' and not an externally existing object (v. 61). The final conclusion runs as follows: "So the fact is that whatever be the form of cognition is the form of object not that whatever be the form of object is the form of cognition Certainly, when its existence is thus dependent on cognition who will posit an object (in the form of something independent)?" (vv. 62-63)
(b) The Idealist Case Refuted (vv. 64-264)
While presenting the idealist's case Kumārila has given prominence to those points which the latter considers to be most suitable for the latter's purpose, but while refuting
this case he has given prominence to just those of these points which he considers to be most suitable for his own purpose. Broadly speaking, this refutation might be divided into three parts, viz. (i) the part covering vv. 64-200 which is most crucial, (ii) that covering vv. 201-29 which considers just one question, viz. how the same object might be cognized differently by different observers, and (iii) that covering vv. 230-64
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