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Refutation of Idealism
93
allegely contradicts the ordinary waking cognitions is supposed to be necessarily possessed of certa in extraordinary capacities but that no such capacities are available ia th: case of the corroborative instance of dream-cognition whose contradiction is brought about by a plain man's waking cognition (vv. 99-100). By now Kumärila has said almost everything that he had to by way of refuting the idealist inference. Here now remain only two relatively minor points-one related to the probans, the other related to the corroborative instance.
Let us recall that in the idealist inference the probans is being cognition: but since the locus here is 'cognition' Kumārila feels that the case is ano. malous inasmuch as what has yet to be proved is acting as probans. As we have learnt from his treatment of inference Kumārila's solution for such an anymily is that the probaas is a universal and the locus a particular object where this universal is present. In the present case, however, Kumārila disallows this solution because he and the idealist Buddhist hold two different conceptions of what a 'universal' is (vv. 102-4). So his verdict is that the Buddhist must say that the probans is as much a particular object as the locus is from which follow all those difficulties to avoid which Kumāríla had devised the solution noted just above (vv. 105-6). All this is sheer confusion of thought. For the only thing that the idealist is expected to do is to show that his probans characterizes the locus and tbat it stands in the relation of vyāpti with the probandum. Now as it stands the idealist's locus is 'waking cognition not 'cognition', but in either case it would in fact be characterized by his probans--viz. being cognition'. As for there obtaining vyāpti betwoon the probans and the probandum there is no logical bar to it too--for the probans is the feature being cogaition' and the probandum the feature being false' and a vyāpti does always hold between two features; (that the idealist's vyāpti is invalid is an empirical difficulty not a logical difficulty).
In connection with the corroborative instance Kumārlia considers a point which has in some way been already raised. For the corroborative instance in question is 'dream-cognition' and Kumārila says that it is not a valid corroborative instance because it lacks the probandum-viz. 'lack-of-object (falsity)'. That is to say, Kumärlia feels that even dream-cognition is not devoid of all object, a point he has already raised while discussing the probandum; (there is nothing surprising about it for after all here too Kumārila is saying that the corroborative instance lacks the probandum and this is a statement as much about the corroborative instance as about probandum). While discussing the question Kumārila considers a number of concrete instances of illusory perception and comes out with the contention that in the case of none the object is something whose constituent elements are not something already perceived earlier (vv. 107-14). As to why these instances are called an instance of illusory perception, that is because the object concerned is not here coming in contact with a sense-organ. By way of elucidation Kumārila says that there is nothing anom
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