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94
Šlokavārtika--a study
alous about an absent object producing a cognition concerning itself, for what an absent object does not do is to produce valid perception concerning itself (vv. 11416). Certainly it is never Kumārila's contention that an 'illusory perception of X' is a case of 'valid perception of x' though it is his contention that it is a case of 'coge nition of x.
After thus completing what might be called his refutation proper of the idealist inference Kumārila examines a rather general though related question, viz. whether the idealist has a right to enter into a debate with another party; (towards the close of this examination a question of still more general nature is raised). On the face of it the question seems rather perverse, for nothing can prevent an author from writing a book propounding whatever views he finds worth that. As a matter of fact, however, Kumārila has a point. For all debate presupposes the possibility of distinguishing a true statement from a false one but if all statements we make in our daily life are equally false—as they are according to the idealist-there is no point in holding a debate whose very purpose is to decide whether particular statement is true or false. The idealist's usual defence is that while entering into a debate he for the time being believes in the possibility of distiguishing a true empirical statement from a false one, but this is a thoroughly anomalous procedure inasmuch as it is precisely at the time of entering into a debate that one must stick fast to one's basic philosophical convictions. In the present part of his text Kumārila is hitting at this fatal anomaly of the idealist's stand. He begins by observing that he alone has a right to enter into a debate who believes in the reality of the means of a debate but that the idealist does not believe in the reality of these means (vv. 128-29). The idealist argues that wit he offers in a debate is what the rival himself is ready to graat and that it is im paterial whether the former grants it or not (vv. 129-30). Kumārila retorts that in a debate one should offer only what both the parties are ready to grant (v. 131). In this connection he can appreciate the conduct of a debator who offers what he grants but not the rival but not that of one who—like the idealist - offers what the rivals grants but not he himself (vv. 131-135). The idealist repeats his contention that the rival should grant a conclusion if it follows from the premises acceptable to the latter-even while they are not acceptable to the former himself (vv. 135–36), Kumā. rila retorts that the truth or falsity of a conclusion does not depend on whether or not the premises concerned are acceptable to this party or that but on whether or not these premises are true so that one seeking to establish a cooclusion on the basis of certain premises must be in a position to demonstrate that these premises are true (vv. 139-48). Thus on his showing, what happens in a debate is that one party seeks to establish a conclusion on the basis of premises which it can prove to be true while the other party seeks to refute this conclusion by proving that these premises are not true (vv. 149-54). The idealist pleads that what he offers as premises are such as used to appear tenable to him formerly though they appear tenable to him no more
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